






Formal beef alliances and alignment challenges: 
 Issues in contracting, pricing and quality 
Bodo Steiner 
Principle Researcher 























Department of Rural Economy 
Faculty of Agriculture & Forestry,  
and Home Economics 
University of Alberta 
Edmonton, Canada   II 
Formal beef alliances and alignment challenges: 
Issues in contracting, pricing and quality 
 














Department of Rural Economy, University of Alberta 
515 General Services Building 




Fax: 780-492-0268  i 
Acknowledgements 
 
This  project  was  funded  by  the  National  Beef  Industry  Development  Fund.    The 
assistance  of  cattle  producer  organizations  in  Alberta,  Saskatchewan,  Manitoba  and 
British Columbia with the survey is gratefully acknowledged. Kevin Lan, Rural Economy 
graduate student did much of the analysis of the cow-calf survey as part of his M.Sc. 
thesis. Gabriel John, Rural Economy graduate student did much of the research on price 
spreads  and  competition  issues  as  part  of  his  M.Sc.  thesis.  Emmanuel  Laate,  Rural 
Economy research assistant, undertook several parts of the risk analysis. Peter Boxall was 
very  helpful  during  the  development  of  the  survey.  A  number  of  undergraduate  and 
college students were instrumental in completing the on-site surveys. We are particularly 
grateful  to  several  cow-calf  producers  from  Alberta  who  assisted  us  with  the  survey 
development.    ii 
Formal beef alliances and alignment challenges: Issues 




Vertical  coordination  throughout  Canada’s  beef  supply  chain  is  imperfect  on  several 
accounts. We observe failures in the established pricing system, the established grading 
system, a lack of appropriate incentives for investments to promote adding value, and 
misalignments due to the increasing industry concentration at the processor level. Since 
all of these issues are inherently linked, the proposed project has aimed to address them 
in an integrated manner. At the heart of this study is a firm-level analysis of alignment 
and risk-management problems at the cow-calf sector. 
 
A  survey  of  cow-calf  producers  in  Western  Canada  evaluated  their  willingness  to 
participate  in  beef  alliances.    The  initial  part  of  the  survey  suggested  that  cow-calf 
producers view auction markets as price competitive but perhaps these markets are less 
successful at rewarding cattle quality.  Very few of the surveyed participants had used 
contracts such as forward contracts or futures contracts in their cow-calf business. 
 
Slightly over 22 percent of the participants indicated they would not participate in any 
beef alliance.  The remaining survey group that did indicate a willingness to participate in 
a beef alliance showed a clear preference for the following: 
·  Alliance  purchase  calves  from  producer  and  producer  have  the  opportunity  to 
participate in profit sharing. 
·  Producers prefer to receive information on individual live animal performance 
versus individual carcass performance. 
·  Producers  prefer  minimal  restrictions  on  production  protocols  and  numbers  of 
animals that must be committed to participate in the alliance. 
·  A  small  per  head  alliance  fee  paid  by  the  producer  was not  a  major  issue in 
determining willingness to participate in the alliance.   iii 
These survey results above suggest the key issues that need to be addressed in alliance 
contracts.    However  it  may  be  difficult  to  appropriately  include  price  risk  in  these 
contracts if the alliance is also trying to share risk along the value chain.  Analysis of 
secondary price data and other researcher conclusions indicate that contracts for Alberta 
cow-calf producers that include pricing based upon fed cattle or meat cut out values will 
expose producers to more variability in cow-calf returns.  This risk cannot be effectively 
managed with existing market based risk tools.  The choice of cow-calf producer alliance 
participants would be a pricing scheme that eliminated most if not all of the downside 
risk associated with fed cattle or meat cut out values. Cow-calf producers risk perception 
versus  actual  level  of  risk  may  not  always  be  aligned.  This  may  create  increased 
difficulties in designing alliance contracts that appropriately share risk along the value-
chain. 
 
Successful alliance schemes that include cow-calf producers require more work on the 
compensation scheme. Specific risk-based compensations schemes need to be explored in 
more depth and in the broader context of the key value chain members to develop more 
appropriate  alliance  contracts.  The  divergence  between  perceived  and  actual  risks 
deserves particular attention. 
 
Results from our analysis on price spreads and competition at the packer, wholesale and 
retail level suggest that the industry has become somewhat more competitive since May 
2003. While there were no noticeable differences between western and eastern regions of 
Canada,  large  disparities  in  price  spreads  were  found  between  Canada  and  the  US. 
Competition issues were not too dissimilar in the two countries with some evidence of 
imperfect competition pre-BSE (1980- May, 2003) in Canada and US, but much less 
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 I Introduction and project objectives 
 
The study set out to address alignment problems in the Canadian beef industry through 
both  a  firm-level  and  an  industry-level  analysis.  Several  deficiencies  and  issues  in 
vertical coordination throughout Canada’s beef supply chain were initially identified, and 
several analyses were identified to address them.  
 
1.  The  pricing  system:    From  the  US  as  well  as  from  Europe,  we  have  mounting 
evidence that the established pricing system, in which base price is tied to a cash market, 
has major flaws (Purcell, 2000; MacDonald et al., 2004). Deficiencies in the established 
pricing  system  appear  to  be  even  more  prevalent  in  Canada  (Schroeder,  2003).
1  
However, it is also well documented that contracts can provide appropriate incentives for 
long-term investment to supply chain members, as well as improve alignment of cattle 
qualities supplied with final consumer demands (Purcell, 2000; Bailey, 2003; MacDonald 
et  al.,  2004).  As  for  Canada,  there  is  evidence  that  formal  alliances  have  not  been 
embraced on a large scale by industry members (Wood, Pratt and Grosenick, 2003, p.31). 
This  suggests  that  there  is  economic  potential  to  be  exploited  from  such  improved 
alignment through innovative pricing schemes in contracting schemes in the Canadian 
market.  
 
2. The grading system: Considering that Canada uses the copyrighted grading standards 
employed in the US (a high degree of association, approximately 85%, exists between the 
marbling  standards  of  the  Canadian  and  American  high  quality  beef  grades:  CBEF, 
2005), it is tempting to conclude that inadequate grades and the related quality variation 
problems  that  have  been  identified  for  the  US  (Purcell,  2000),  can  be  partly  made 
responsible for the lack of alignment in Canada. Brocklebank and Hobbs (2004) support 
this assertion for Canadian beef by emphasizing that: “…, it is widely recognized that the 
existing Canadian and U.S. grading systems do not identify adequate proxy variables for 
                                                 
1 “One place Canada lags behind the U.S. is with regards to the number of fed cattle that are being sold on a value-based grid.” 
Schroeder (2003), p.12.   2 
measurements of eating quality such as tenderness.” (p.7).
2 Further, based on the beef 
quality audit that was conducted in Canada in 1998-99, Van Donkersgoed et al. (2001) 
conclude  that  “Based  on  August  1998  to  July  1999  prices,  it  was  estimated  that  the 
Canadian beef industry lost $82.62 per head processed, or $274 million annually, from 
quality nonconformities, which was an increase from 1995.”  
 
3.  Lack  of  appropriate  incentives  for  investment  to  promote  adding  value:  The 
implications from inadequate grading and ineffective market reporting have been felt in 
the  US  in  terms  of  lack  of  investment  and  innovation  of  value-added  beef  products 
(Purcell,  2004).  Similar  observations  with  regards  to  the  lack  of  innovation  in  value 
chains can be made for Canada, although this can be partly explained by the past strong 
export dependence on low value-added beef products. Nevertheless, given the current 
desire to find new target markets and to recapture those that were previously held by 
Canada, appropriate investment and innovation incentives deserve top priority. 
  
4. Industry consolidation: Recent changes in the Canadian beef industry structure are 
reflected in a small number of mid-sized processors. The related emergence of thinner 
spot markets for slaughter cattle has cast doubt on the competitiveness and fairness of 
pricing mechanisms used. Wood et al. (2003) have therefore emphasized that industry 




Given the above challenges to the Canadian beef industry, the research project tried to 
address the following issues:  
 
(1.)  How  can  contract  incentives  and  formal  beef  alliances  help  to  overcome 
undesirable  quality  variation?  A  recent  survey  of  cow-calf  producers  in  western 
Canada  revealed  that  cow-calf  producers  have,  on  average,  a  preference  for  a 
combination of live weight and carcass quality pricing, even though using this pricing 
                                                 
2 “In an Alberta survey, over 30 percent of steaks and 35 percent of roasts purchased in a six month period were ranked as 
unacceptable for tenderness by a trained lab panel (Brewin and Ulrich, 1999).” Brocklebank and Hobbs (2004), p.7. 
3 Similar concerns have been raised for the US market: Schroeter and Azzam (1990); Schroeter, Azzam and Zhang (2000); Azzam 
(2003).   3 
method means that they incur some of the risk associated with variability in cattle quality 
(Brocklebank  and  Hobbs,  2004).  This  important  result  suggests  that  an  analysis  of 
incentives as part of contracts and beef alliances is critical for achieving desired quality 
changes.  Further,  Brocklebank  and  Hobbs  (2004)  found  that,  “Overall,  the  risk  of 
opportunistic behaviour as a result of investment in specific assets is minimal and has not 
had a great impact on the degree of supply chain coordination.” (p.58). This finding 
emphasizes that an analysis of alignment issues in the beef sector should focus on other 
issues  than  production  and  health  protocols,  as  these  can  be  considered  as  relation-
specific investments. Instead, the question is what role monetary incentives and other 
attributes  of  beef  alliances  (and  incentive  contracts  therein)  can  have.  Further  the 
question  of  this  study  was  to  what  extent  our  results  would  confirm  the  findings  of 
Brocklebank and Hobbs (2004), since this study was conducted in December of 2003. 
 
(1.a.)  What  pricing  mechanisms  provide  appropriate  incentives  for  quality 
consistency  and  improved  alignment?  The  general  conclusion  of  Brocklebank  and 
Hobbs (2004) is that a pricing system based solely on carcass quality remains unpopular 
with many cow-calf producers. More specifically, the study results suggest that cow-calf 
producers  are  willing  to  bear  some  price  risk  by  being  compensated  through  a 
combination of live weight and carcass quality pricing. Therefore, our study aimed to 
capitalize on this finding by analyzing producers’ willingness to manage risks (a) through 
participation  in  alliances,  where  producers  would  pay  certain  price  premiums  (or 
requirements to be compensated) for specific contract and alliance characteristics, and (b) 
through other means outside of the direct alliance relationship.  
 
More support to proceed in this way comes from a study funded by the NBDIF (Wood et 
al. 2003), which has also identified that several key players in the Canadian beef supply 
chain support the incorporation of retail prices into the compensation formula for beef 
producers  (p.25,  29).  Also,  the  fact  that  Canada  uses  a  mandatory  individual  animal 
identification  program  lends  support  to  an  investigation  of  pricing  schemes  that  tie 
producer compensation closely to retail prices.  
   4 
(1.b.) Managing risks within contracts and encouraging successful participation in 
formal alliances: Since cow-calf producers were found to have an affinity to contracts 
that do not expose them to additional risk by linking compensation to processed beef and 
retail prices, the Brocklebank and Hobbs (2004) study proposes two ways to encourage 
producer participation in such alliances. First, the authors propose to focus on cow-calf 
producers’ education with regards to benefits of a grid-based pricing system. Second, the 
authors propose to use methods so as to help individuals to manage their exposure to risk. 
This  project  also  tried  to  evaluate  possible  benefits  to  producers  of  managing  risk 
exposure more extensively.  
 
(2.) Analysis of price spreads and competition pre- and post-BSE: A coherent firm-
level analysis of improved pricing mechanisms and risk-management tools needs to be 
placed into the overall industry context. Acknowledging the limitations in terms of access 
to firm level data for the highly concentrated meat packer industry (Brocklebank and 
Hobbs 2004, p.5), our study set out to analyze competition issues in the US and Canada 
at the aggregate level (producers, packers, wholesalers, retailers). 
 
Our  analysis  in  this  report  consists  of  three  parts.  Part  one  (section  II)  includes  a 
descriptive analysis of cow-calf survey participants and an experimental study of beef 
alliance participation. Part two (section III) analyzes risk attitudes and risk management 
issues facing cow-calf producers. Part three (section IV) explores market power issues in 
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II Analysis of cow-calf survey and beef alliances 
 
II.1. Cow-calf producer survey 
This  study  covers  four  Western  provinces,  namely,  British  Columbia,  Alberta, 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba. Based on a membership list that was made accessible by 
one of the beef producers associations (Alberta), and as a result of the other associations’ 
active efforts to approach cow-calf producers for participation in this survey, 951 cattle 
producers were contacted by telephone. The scope of the survey was severely limited due 
to  the  constraints  that  most  beef  producer  associations  faced  in  terms  of  making 
membership  lists  accessible  for  our  research  purpose.  Initially,  the  2001  Agricultural 
consensus was used to identify how many cow-calf producers should be contacted from 
each province and from each region within a given province, such as to guarantee a 
representative  sampling.  However,  due  to  the  inability  to  contact  producers  directly 
outside of Alberta, this sampling information could not be used outside of Alberta. As a 
result, it was expected that our survey would result in an over sampling from Alberta.  
 
During the telephone screening, the producers were first asked whether they would in 
principal be willing to participate in an online-survey. The respondents were then told 
that the same survey could also be completed during an on-site interview, where trained 
students  would  use  an  electronic  version  of  the  survey  on  a  laptop.  No  financial 
incentives  were  given  for  participation.  The  survey  varied  in  length,  since  it  was 
constructed in a tree-structure, to circumvent questions most effectively that would not 
apply to a particular type of cow-calf producer. On average, it took 15 to 20 minutes to 
complete a survey. Of the 151 cow-calf producers that participated in the survey, 100 
were surveyed on-site, and the remaining 51 completed the same survey on-line. It should 
be noted that until spring of 2006, we had only 110 completed surveys, which were 
obtained  through  the  above  sampling  procedure.  During  the  summer,  a  privately 
organized group of beef producers from north of Westlock (Alberta) raised their interest 
in participating in the survey, as a result of which we obtained another 41 completed 
surveys.   6 
Especially  due  to  the  over  sampling  of  Alberta  producers,  the  question  is  how 
representative  the  survey  population  is  relative  to  the  entire  Canadian  producer 
population. Compared to the 2001 Census of Agriculture and compared to the survey 
population of Brocklebank and Hobbs (2004), the producers in our sample have a larger 
beef cowherd size (Table 1, p.7). The sample has also a higher education level compared 
to the 2001 census data. The sample is also younger than the census population, but 
slightly older than that of Brocklebank and Hobbs (2004).  
 
As shown in Figure 1 (p.8), the majority of respondents (50%) belong to the category of 
mainly cow-calf operations. The distribution of age classes across on-line or and on-site 
surveys was of interest, since it was hypothesized that younger respondents would be 
more likely to choose an on-line survey rather than an on-site interview. However, the 
distribution  was  not  as  clear  cut.  As  shown  in  Figure  2  (p.8),  more  than  71%  of 
respondents from the age group 31-41 completed the survey on-site, and more than 79% 
that were age 61 and older completed the survey on-site. 
   7 
Table 1. Comparison of the sample population 
Percentage in Category 
    Census  
of Agriculture (2001) 
Brocklebank and 
Hobbs (2004) 
This study  
Gross Revenues ($'000' s)             
0-10  21.00%  6.00% 
10-49  29.00%  11.00% 
50-99  14.00%  16.00% 
100-249  20.00%  30.00% 
250-499  10.00%  23.00% 
500+  6.00%  14.00% 
No Comparable Data 
Available 
Farm Income from Beef   
Less than 25%  35.45% 
Between 25% and 50%  11.82% 
More than 50% 
No Comparable Data 
Available 
No Comparable Data 
Available 
52.73% 
Alliance Participation             
Yes  15.00%  76.36% 
No 
No Comparable Data 
Available  85.00%  23.64% 
Herd Size             
0-50  20.00%  38.18% 
50-100  18.00% 
100-150  20.00% 
36.36% 
150-200  21.00% 
200-300  10.00% 
19.09% 
300+ 
Avg. Canadian Herd Size: 
53 Head; Avg. Western 
Canadian Herd Size: 67 
Head  
11.00%  6.36% 
Education
4             
High School  62.00%  29.00%  53.64% 
College  27.00%  27.00%  28.18% 
University  11.00%  11.00%  18.18% 
Age
5         
Less than 35  11.50%  35.00%  21.82% 
35-60  53.60%  62.00%  62.72% 
60+  34.90%  3.00%  15.45% 
Source: Statistics Canada & Brocklebank and Hobbs (2004) 
                                                 
4 The Census of Agriculture (2001) uses categories of “less than grade 9”; “grade 9-12”; ‘post secondary 
(non-university”; and “post secondary (university)”.  
5 The survey used in this study categories age of respondents as “ under 30”; “31-40”; “41-50”; “51-60” 
and “60+”.    8 
 














































































   9 
Respondents’ educational levels are categorized as three ways, 1) high school; 2) college; 
and 3) university. As expected, Figure 3 shows that respondents with higher levels of 
education completed the survey on-line.  
 


























































As Figure 4 shows, producers who were willing to complete the survey on-site where 
more income-dependent on beef production compared to producers who completed the 
survey on-line. More than 70% of the on-site respondents earned more than 50% of their 
farm income from beef production. 
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   10 
As Figure 5 shows, producers were also asked to indicate their level of satisfaction with 
regular auction markets in terms of (i) rewarding the qualities of cattle, (ii) in terms of 
professional livestock handling and (iii) in terms of achieving a competitive price (on a 
scale of 1-5 where 1 is “they performed extremely well”, 2 is “very well”, 3 is “ quite 
well”, 4 is “ not very well”, and 5 is “ extremely poor”). Perhaps most surprisingly was 
the finding that the greatest level of satisfaction was expressed for the auction’s perceived 
ability to achieve a competitive price (22% of the respondents stated that the auction 
performed extremely well in this regard). However, as expected, the auction’s ability to 
reward cattle qualities was judged most poorly, compared to both the price function and 
the ability to professionally handle livestock (1.5% of the producers stated that auction 
markets perform extremely poor, and 9.5% stated that they perform not very well in 
terms of rewarding cattle quality). 
 












































































Cow-calf producers were also asked about their marketing strategies for their 2004 calf 
crop. As shown in Figure 6, more than 70 percent of respondents indicated that they sold 
their calf crops in 2004 as weaned calves. About 30 percent of beef producers indicated 
that they retained ownership and about 50 percent of respondents indicated that they 
handled  their  calf  crops  as  replacement  heifers.  The  remaining  calves  were  “sold  as   11 
preconditioned  calves”  (30%)  or  put  to  others  use  (10%).  The  latter  included 
“backgrounding the light calves”, “slaughtered for personal use”, etc.. 
 
Figure 6: Marketing strategies for 2004 calf crop 


























Using  a  ranking  technique,  respondents  were  asked  to  indicate  their  most  preferred 
marketing strategy through which they handle their weaned calves in 2005. As Figure 7 
shows, auction markets are the most frequently used marketing strategies (more than 
80%). The next most frequently used marketing channel was selling the animals directly 
to finishers (more than 45%). 
   12 
Figure 7: Marketing strategies for weaned calves in 2005 



























As Figure 8 shows, the use of the above marketing channels for weaned calves differed 
substantially  across  on-site  and  on-line  respondents.  In  particular,  nearly  90%  of  all 
animals in the sample that were sold directly to finishers were sold by participants that 
completed the survey on-site. 
 





































   13 
Producers were also asked about their experience of using contractual arrangements in 
2005. As Figure 9 indicates, 49 percent of respondents use informal agreements, and only 
12  percent  of  producers  use  formal  contractual  agreements.  About  39%  of  the 
respondents indicated that they had never used formal contracts before to market their 
calf crop. 
 































In order to explore the types of contracts and risk-management options that producers 
used  further,  we  inquired  about  producers’  experience  of  using  pre-specified  pricing 
contracts  (i.e.,  future  and  forward  contracts),  and  custom  feeding  contracts  in  cattle 
marketing. As shown in Figure 10, fewer than 15 percent of producers have experience 
with either futures or forward contracts.  
   14 
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We  also  asked  respondents  about  their  different  strategies  in  retaining  ownership  to 
background. The majority (50%) feed on their own farm, whereas less than 11% retain 
ownership through a feedlot operation (Figure 11).  
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   15 
For those producers who sold at the backgrounding stage, we were interested in how 
price premiums and discounts were determined. As Figure 12 shows, about 14% of the 
producers  indicated  that  a  regional  average  price  was  used  in  selling  cattle  at  the 
backgrounding  stage.  More  important  was  the  actual  breed  (37%  of  respondents), 
followed  by  other  quality-related  specifications  (49%  of  respondents)  in  determining 
premiums and discounts. 
 











Breed A regional average price that
is directly factored into your
Other quality related
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For sales of finished cattle, only 12 percent of the premiums/discounts were associated 
with quality grades or yield grades (Figure 13). Discount scales for carcasses above a 
particular  weight  class  were  used  more  frequently  (24%).  More  than  35%  of  the 
producers  had  experiences  with  premiums/discounts  that  were  associated  with  other 
specifications related to carcass weight. 
   16 







































Further, we asked respondents whether they would be willing, in principle, to consider 
participation in a formal agreement between cow-calf producers and other members in a 
value chain, and more specifically where this would entail participation in a beef alliance 
that  is  developing  niche  markets.  About  22%  of  all  survey  participants  declined  this 
question (Figure 14).  
Figure 14: Beef alliance participation 
22%
78%
No, I won't participate in a beef alliance
Yes, i will participate in a beef alliance
 
The remaining participants (78%) were told to assume that their animals were close or 
ready to qualify for participating in an alliance, such that they could then consider several 
scenarios, i.e. several types of beef alliances to choose from. The analysis of the choice 
questions are in the next section.   17 
II.2. Analysis of beef alliance participation 
II.2.1. Specification of beef alliances 
The different types of alliances between which cow-calf producers could choose were 
described in terms of sales type, production protocols, information sharing scheme and 
membership fee. These attributes and attributes levels are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Attributes and Attributes Levels of Choice Experiment 
Beef Alliance 
Attributes 
Level 1  Level 2  Level 3  Level 4 
Sale Type 
Sell to alliance, 
NO profit sharing 
Sell to alliance, 
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1. Sales Type (marketing methods)   
The  attribute  of  sales  type  includes  different  combinations  of  marketing  strategies 
adopted  by  cow-calf  operations,  including  details  on  the  compensation  scheme.  The   18 
marketing  strategies  are  direct  sale  to  the  alliance  and  retained  ownership.  The 
compensation scheme is a profit sharing scheme based on animal performance.  
2. Information Sharing Scheme (data sharing)  
The  attributes  of  information  sharing  schemes  include  live  performance  per  pen  or 
individual live performance data, and carcass data of a group of animals or individual 
carcass data. Live performance data per pen represents the status quo of information 
exchange adopted by current cattle auction markets.  
 
3. Production Protocols and quantity commitment  
Production commitments were considered as very important because they determine the 
quality  control  practices  adopted  by  beef  producers.  In  this  study,  the  production 
commitments  include  production  protocols  and  quantity  commitments.  Production 
protocols refer to the use of antibiotics and specific restriction of vaccination.  Quantity 
commitment was represented by number of minimum cattle required by the beef alliance.  
4. Membership Fee 
In  order  to  gain  insight  into  the  effect  that  different  membership  fees  have  on  a 
respondent’s willingness to participate in a program, four levels of membership fees were 
included.  
II.2.2. Empirical Results 
Our  empirical  results  are  based  on  two  models.  The  first  model  (“beef  alliance 
participation model”) explored what types of cow-calf producers were willing (or not) to 
participate  in  a  beef  alliance  in  principle.  The  second  model  (“beef  alliance  choice 
model”) analyzed what type of cow-calf producers were willing to opt for which types of 
beef  alliances.  The  following  discussion  provides  only  the  key  results  and  statistical 
tables (in the appendix). Those readers who wish to explore more details of the statistical 
approach should consult Lan (2006). 
   19 
II.2.2.1. Beef alliance participation model 
The  estimation  results  that  were  used  to  analyze  the  beef  alliance  participation  is 
presented in Table A1.1.  
1. Survey Type 
The  estimates  suggest  that  participants  in  on-site  interviews  were  less  likely  to 
participate in a beef alliance. 
2. Producer Type 
The  results  suggest  that  if  a  beef  enterprise  is  limited  to  a  cow-calf  operation,  the 
producer is unlikely to participate in a beef alliance. On the contrary, producers who 
have mixed production characteristics are more likely to participate in a beef alliance.  
3. Age 
Our expectations of the effect of producer age on beef alliance participation choice are 
indeterminate.  On  the  one  hand,  older  and  more  experienced  cattle  producers  might 
recognize the advantages of alternative marketing arrangements such as beef alliances 
and, thus are willing to adopt them. On the other hand, older producers may be slower to 
adopt  newer  marketing  alternatives.  The  estimates  favour  the  latter  explanation,  as 
younger producers were found to be more likely to participate in a beef alliance. 
4. Education 
It is expected that more educated producers are more likely to adopt alternative marketing 
practices. Indeed, the results suggest that producers with high school and lower levels of 
education are less likely to participate in a beef alliance. 
5. Beef Cowherd Size  
Our findings indicate the smaller cow-calf operations are less likely to participate in a 
beef alliance.     20 
6.  Use of Information   
The variable representing producers’ attitudes toward using information sources (e.g., 
marketing data, contract data, data on cost of production, production and processing data) 
is not significant in the model. However, the positive sign is expected, since it implies 
that producers who are using information sources actively for management purposes are 
more willing to participate in a beef alliance. 
7. Experience of Using Retained Ownership and Contracts  
It was expected that producers who have experienced retaining ownership and contracts 
would  be  more  likely  to  participate  in  a  beef  alliance  (because  either  of  these  two 
strategies implies a closer vertically coordinated marketing relationship throughout the 
value  chain).  This  expectation  was  only  met  in  the  case  of  prior  experience  with 
contracting. The estimate for the experience with retained ownership is significant at the 
10% level with a negative sign, which suggests a negative attitude toward participating in 
a beef alliance. In contrast, the positive sign on the estimate for experience of using 
contracts suggests that prior contracting experience has a positive impact on beef alliance 
participation.  
 
II.2.2.2. Beef alliance choice model 
 
The stated preference results are shown in Table A1.2. (model 2 is the final model). 
 
Most strikingly, our estimation results suggest that none of the attributes that represent 
“production  protocols”  have  a  significant  influence  on  the  choices  between  different 
alliance types. The remaining results are as following, using the descriptions as in Table 
3. 
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Table 3: Variable description used in the choice experiment 
Variable  Descriptions 
S1  Sell to alliance, NO profit sharing 
S2  Sell to alliance, bonuses based on animal performance 
S3  Retain ownership, NO profit sharing 
S4  Retain ownership, profit sharing 
D1  live performance, pen 
D2  live performance, individual data 
D3  Carcass, group data 
D4  carcass, individual yield & grade data 
P1  NO restrictions on vaccination and use of antibiotics & NO min. number of animals required 
P2  NO restrictions on vaccination and use of antibiotics & min. number of animals required 
P3  Restrictions on vaccination and use of antibiotics & NO min. number of animals required 
P4  Restrictions on vaccination and use of antibiotics & min. number of animals required 
FEE  $0,$5,$10,$20 
SRT  Survey Method(1=on-site interview; otherwise 0) 
AGE  Producer Age(1= less than 50;otherwise 0) 
EDU  Producer's Education (1=less than high school(included);otherwise 0) 
INCOME  Farm Income from Beef (1 =less than 50%; otherwise 0) 
HERD  Beef Cowherd Size (1=Less than 150 heads; otherwise 0) 
 
 
1. Sales Type (marketing methods) 
Option S4 (retain ownership, profit sharing) has no statistically significant impact on 
producers’ choices. The estimates for S1 (Sell to alliance, NO profit sharing) indicate that 
producers reject this marketing strategy, whereas the results for S4 (Retain ownership, 
profit sharing) indicate a positive attitude toward this marketing strategy. The following 
order of producers’ preferences for the attribute of sales type (from high to low) can be 
derived: “sell to the alliance, bonuses based on animal performance”, “retain ownership, 
profit sharing”, “retain ownership, No profits sharing” and “sell to alliance, No profit 
sharing”, respectively. The difference between “sell to alliance” and “retain ownership” 
suggests that cow-calf producers opt away from scenarios with potential profits resulting 
from retaining ownership, toward scenarios where profits can be realized in a fast way. In 
this  situation,  a  marketing  strategy  similar  to  auction  markets  (i.e.,  sell  to  alliance 
directly) is perceived to be superior to a closer vertically coordinated relationship (i.e. 
retain ownership).    22 
2. Information Sharing Scheme (data sharing) 
The  estimation  results  suggest  that  this  category  of  attributes  strongly  influences 
individual  choice  behavior.  The  only  attribute  in  this  category  that  does  not  have  a 
significant impact on choice behaviour is D4 (carcass, individual yield & grade data). 
The preference order appears to be that producers choose from D2 (live performance, 
individual data), D4 (carcass, individual yield & grade data), D1 (live performance, per 
pen), and then D3 (carcass, group data). Similarly to the attributes of sales type, cow-calf 
producers’ preference for the information sharing schemes is limited to a low intensity 
level of coordination scheme. Respondents appear to opt away from the spot cash market 
(live performance, per pen), towards a closer level of coordination (live performance, 
individual data). Hence, the results also suggest that producers’ prefer using individual 
data rather group data (D1: pen, D2: group).  
3. Production Protocols 
The results suggest that all attribute levels of “production protocols” are insignificant in 
affecting producers’ choice behavior. Producers’ preferences are in the following order: 
P2 (NO restrictions on vaccination and use of antibiotics & minimum number of animals 
required), P3 (restrictions on vaccination and use of antibiotics & No minimum number 
of animals required), P4 (restrictions on vaccination and use of antibiotics & minimum 
number  of  animals  required),  and  P1  (No  restrictions  on  vaccination  and  use  of 
antibiotics  &  No  minimum  number  of  animals  required).  Thus,  producers  appear  to 
perceive the restriction in terms of the minimum number of animals as least restrictive. 
Further, the producers’ positive attitude toward accepting “restrictions on vaccination and 
use of antibiotics” could be interpreted as producers anticipating more quality control and 
restrictions to be forthcoming in the future.  
 
4. Membership Fee 
The results suggest that, as expected, higher fees are less likely to induce producers to 
participate  in  the  alliances  offered.  However,  although  the  results  suggest  that 
membership fees play a significant role in a producer’s choice behavior in participating in 
alternative beef alliance, its effect is small.   23 
II.2.2.2.a. The impact of demographics 
 
We examined the effect that demographic characteristics have on an individual’s choice 
of a beef alliance.  The results suggest that smaller beef producers prefer an information 
sharing  scheme  using  individual  live  performance  data.  In  the  case  of  D4  (carcass, 
individual yield & grade data), the results suggest a positive attitude toward information 
sharing scheme that uses carcass, individual yield and grade data. However, the estimates 
also  suggest  that  the  smaller  beef  producers  do  not  prefer  a  beef  alliance  with  an 
information sharing scheme of D4.  Further, the results suggest that low income beef 
producers  are  not  willing  to  choose  a  beef  alliance  with  a  sales  type  of  S4  (retain 
ownership, profit sharing).  
II.2.2.2.b. Willingness to Pay 
The willingness-to-pay estimates are instructive for comparing the ranking of attributes 
and  attribute  levels.  For  both  the  entire  sample  of  respondents  (the  unconditional 
population,  i.e.  including  producers  that  refused  to  participate  in  alliances)  and 
respondents that participated in the choice experiment (conditional population), the most 
important  attribute  for  a  beef  alliance  is  the  information  sharing  scheme.  Producers 
associated higher marginal willingness-to-pay with “live performance, individual data” 
compared to “carcass, individual yield & grade data”. of the option “Carcass, group data” 
was valued least by producers in this sample. The second most important attribute is sales 
type. Producers are willing to pay between $15.26/ head and $6.43/head for the attribute 
of  “sale  to alliance,  bonus  on  the animal  performance”  and  “retain ownership, profit 
sharing”, respectively. The least important attribute is related to the production protocols; 
producers  are  willing  to  pay  only  $5.06/head  for  the  attribute  of  “No  restrictions  on 
vaccination and use of antibiotics & minimum number of animals required” while they 
are not willing to pay for the attributes “restrictions on vaccination and use of antibiotics 
& No minimum number of animals required” and “restrictions on vaccination and use of 
antibiotics & minimum number of animals required”. As expected, producers were also 
not willing to pay for “sale to alliance, No profit sharing”.   24 
 
II.3. Alternative Beef Alliance Scenarios  
 
The  insights  from  those  scenarios  can  be  used  to  explore  producers’  motivations  for 
choosing new and different types of beef alliances in the future.  
1. Alternative Beef Alliance Scenario (S2 vs. S4) 
The first scenario assumes that there are two alternatives, Alliance A and B. Both of these 
alternatives have the same attributes except that the sales type in alternative A is “sell to 
alliance, bonuses based on animal performance” while the one in alternative B is “retain 
ownership, profit sharing”. A cost reduction of 58% of the membership fee in Alliance B 
is required to equalize the probability of choosing between these two sales types.  
2. Alternative Beef Alliance Scenario (D2 vs.D4) 
The  second  scenario  assumes  that  both  of  thes  alternatives  have  the  same  attributes 
except  that  the  information  sharing  scheme  in  alternative  A  is  “live  performance, 
individual data” while the one in alternative B is “carcass, individual yield & grade data”. 
In this case, a cost reduction of 66% of the membership fee in Alliance B is required to 
equalize the probability of choosing between these two alternatives.  
3. Alternative Beef Alliance Scenario 3 (P2 vs. P4) 
Alternative  A  has  the  same  attributes  as  B  except  that  the  production  protocols  in 
alternative A is “No restriction and min. number of animals required” and the one in 
alternative B is “Restriction and minimum number of animals required”. In this case, a 
cost reduction of 55% of the membership fee for Alliance B is required to equalize the 
probability of choosing between these two productions protocols.  
 
The  scenarios  reported  above  were  designed  by  shifting  from  the  most  preferred 
attributes toward the attribute level with the highest degree of vertical coordination in the 
choice experiment. These results suggest a significant cost reduction associated with the 
shifts in a single category of attributes. Considering the small magnitude for the price 
factor (i.e., membership fee) in this sample, it appears that the incentive problem toward   25 
the higher degree of vertical coordination cannot be solved only by reducing the financial 
commitment of participating in a beef alliance. This suggests that the trade-off between a 
significant cost reduction (in terms of the level of participation fee) and an improvement 
in vertical coordination requires a different, more refined type of compensation scheme 
that accounts for risk more explicitly.  
 
 
II.4. Summary and policy implications 
 
In sum, our results suggest that cow-calf producers see benefits in participating in those 
beef alliances that were presented to them. They appear to see the underlying benefits 
from  increasing  formal  contracting  and  the  resulting  improved  coordination  between 
actors in the beef supply chain.  
 
The  following  variables  significantly  affected  the  beef  alliance  participation:  survey 
method,  producer  type,  age,  education,  beef  cowherd  size,  and  experience  of  using 
retained ownership. Somewhat unexpectedly, cow-calf producers that were interviewed 
through on-site surveys were found to be unlikely to participate in the beef alliances 
presented. Considering the entire sample (responses from both the on-line and on-site 
interviews), farms that were limited to cow-calf operations were found to be unlikely to 
participate in a beef alliance. On the contrary, producers who have mixed production 
characteristics are more likely to participate in a beef alliance. Further, younger producers 
are more likely to participate in a beef alliance than the older producers. Producers with 
relative lower educational level (i.e., high school and less) are less likely to participate in 
a beef alliance than those more educated producers. The smaller cow-calf producers are 
less likely to participate in a beef alliance than the large producers. Producers who have 
experience using retained ownership are less likely to participate in a beef alliance than 
those  producers  who  did  not  retain  ownership  before.  The  demographic  and 
socioeconomic characteristics that do not significantly influence or do not have a strong 
influence on respondents’ choice behavior include respondent’s income, attitude toward 
use of information and the experience of using marketing or production contracts. Most   26 
of these empirical results from the beef alliance participation model were consistent with 
prior  hypotheses  (i.e.,  expected  sign)  that  younger,  more  educated  and  larger  beef 
producers may be expected to more likely use of alternative marketing arrangements in 
cattle business such as strategic beef alliance. Brocklebank and Hobbs (2004) found that 
the beef cowherd size, age, education impact on the transaction characteristics of cow-
calf producers, and influence their choice behavior in adopting alternative marketing and 
production practice.  
 
It  is  worth  emphasizing  that  producers’  use  of  production  and  management-related 
information  does  not  have  a  significant  impact  on  alliance  participation,  although  a 
positive relationship between them was as expected.  It was expected that the need for 
information sharing is one of the major incentives for beef producers to closer vertically 
integrate. Because the participants and non-participants were distinguished through the 
hieratical structure of survey questionnaire, a further exploration of the attitude toward 
information sharing was examined through a second model.         
 
The  results  from  the  second  model  suggest  that  the  attributes  of  “sales  type”, 
“information sharing scheme” and “membership fee” significantly affect the respondent’s 
choice behavior. Producers appear to opt away from the status quo of non-integration, 
toward a closer coordinated beef marketing and production system. Production protocols 
did not have a significant impact on the respondent’s choice behavior.  
 
The results obtained from the second model further suggest that the following order of 
producers’ preferences for the attribute of sales type (from high to low) can be derived: 
“sell to the alliance, bonuses based on animal performance”, “retain ownership, profit 
sharing”, “retain ownership, No profit sharing” and “sell to alliance, No profit sharing”, 
respectively.  
 
Considering respondents’ attitudes towards information sharing schemes, there appears to 
be a clear preference to opt away from spot cash markets (live performance, per pen), 
towards  a  closer  level  of  coordination  (live  performance,  individual  data).  Following   27 
“live performance, per pen”, the respondents’ next preferred choice is to use information 
sharing scheme of “carcass, individual yield & grade data”, followed by “carcass, group 
data”. The results also suggest that producers prefer using individual data rather group 
data.  
 
With  regard  to  the  attribute  of  “production  protocols”,  each  level  of  this  attribute 
insignificantly affects the respondent’s choice behavior. But the magnitude and sign of 
coefficient estimates suggest that producers’ preferences for production protocols are in 
the following order: “No restrictions on vaccination and use of antibiotics & minimum 
number of animals required”, “restrictions on vaccination and use of antibiotics & No 
minimum  number  of  animals  required”,  “No  restrictions  on  vaccination  and  use  of 
antibiotics & No minimum number of animals required” and “restrictions on vaccination 
and use of antibiotics & minimum number of animals required”. 
 
The attribute of ‘membership fee’ examined the respondent’s preference for different 
level of financial commitments to beef alliances. As expected, an increasing participation 
fee lowers the respondents’ utility and willingness to participate in an alliance. However, 
the small magnitude of the estimated coefficient also suggests that this effect is slight.   
 
The interactions terms with demographic variables indicate that only income and beef 
cowherd  size  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  respondent’s  choice  behavior.  The 
interaction terms also suggest that compared to larger beef producers, smaller ones prefer 
an  information  sharing  scheme  that  relies  on  individual  live  performance  data.  The 
cumulative  effects  also  suggest  that  the  smaller  beef  producers  do  not  prefer  a  beef 
alliance with an information sharing scheme of “carcass, individual yield & grade data”.  
 
With regards to different farm income levels, the cumulative income effects suggest that 
lower income beef producers are less likely to choose a beef alliance with a sales type of 
‘retain ownership, profit sharing’ compared to high income beef producers. However, the 
farm income level does not have significant impact on the preference for different levels 
of membership fees.    28 
 
Overall,  the  most  important  attributes  for  a  beef  alliance  is  the  information  sharing 
scheme. Producers have greater preferences for “live performance, individual data” rather 
than “carcass, individual yield & grade data”. The results further suggest that the second 
most important attribute is sales type. Producers are willing to pay between $15.26/ head 
and $6.43/head for the sales type options that were available (“sell to alliance, bonus on 
the animal performance” and “retain ownership, profit sharing”, respectively). However, 
and as expected, producers are not willing to pay for the attribute of “sell to alliance, No 
profit  sharing”.  The  least  important  attribute  is  related  to  the  production  protocols; 
producers  are  willing  to  pay  only  $5.06/head  for  the  attribute  of  “No  restrictions  on 
vaccination and use of antibiotics & minimum number of animals required” while they 
are not willing to pay for the attributes “restrictions on vaccination and use of antibiotics 
& No minimum number of animals required” and “restrictions on vaccination and use of 
antibiotics & minimum number of animals required”. 
 
 
The  results  of  this  analysis  enable  us  to  highlight  some  issues  regarding  formal 
contractual  arrangements  and  the  design  of  strategic  alliances  in  the  Canadian  beef 
industry. Given the assumptions and the limited sample size of this study, the following 
implications can be derived: 
 
(1)  Although  the  use  of  conventional  auction  market  is  still  a  dominant  marketing 
strategy in the current beef supply chain, cow-calf producers recognize the limitation of 
spot cash transaction where consumers’ needs for specific qualities can only be matched 
imperfectly. This is reflected in the fact that cow-calf producers show a positive attitude 
toward alternative marketing arrangements such as strategic alliances.  
 
(2) Cow-calf producers are willing to move from the status quo of no coordination toward 
a higher level of vertically coordination. However, they are not willing to choose the 
highest level of vertical coordination. The highest levels of vertical coordination such as 
“carcass, individual yield and grade data”, and “restrictions on vaccination and use of   29 
antibiotics & minimum number of animals required” imply a required increase in relation 
specific investment. The transaction cost literature suggests that producers’ utility will 
decrease with an increasing investment in asset specificity as the potential for hold-up 
increases  (Williamson  1985).  The  results  therefore  suggest  that  cow-calf  producers 
appear to recognize the increasing danger of being held-up. But the results also suggest 
that producers consider the benefits from being able to access individual yield and grade 
data to be smaller than the costs associated with hold-up and relationship-building in a 
value chain (beef alliance). 
 
(3)  Previous  research  on  the  Canadian  beef  industry  based  on  the  transaction  cost 
framework of Williamson (1985) suggests that the risk of opportunistic behavior as a 
result of required investment in specific assets is minimal, and has not had a great impact 
on the degree of supply chain coordination around 2003 (Brocklebank and Hobbs 2004). 
Our insignificant coefficient estimates for “production protocols” suggest that producers 
perceive  that  such  relation-specific  investments  are  not  key  inhibitors  for  improving 
alignment in beef alliances, and are thus in line with Brocklebank and Hobbs’s (2004) 
findings.  However,  considering  our  conclusions  from  (2)  with  regards  to  producers’ 
perceptions towards other relation-specific investments, our overall findings are not as 
conclusive as Brocklebank and Hobbs (2004). This mixed evidence can be attributed to 
the fact that our analysis has allowed for more facets of relation-specific investments. 
Nevertheless, if we consider producers’ responses from the choice experiment with other 
responses in the survey, there appears to be definitive evidence that producers are very 
aware of hold-up, trust and relationship-building issues in beef value chains. 
 
(4) To address the incentive problems that cow-calf producers face, our results suggest 
that a well-designed compensation scheme needs to be part of a beef alliance design. Our 
simulation  results  suggest  that  cow-calf  producers  recognize  the  trade-off  between 
significant cost reductions and an improvement of vertical coordination. However, an 
adjustment of financial commitments, such as reducing the level of alliance membership 
fees,  is  unlikely  to  be  a  sufficient  way  to  solve  the  incentive  problem  that  cow-calf   30 
producers face. The challenge remains to build alliances in which compensation schemes 
are complementary to other key management decisions (Steiner 2007). 
  
(4) Beef producer’s individual specific characteristics (demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics) were found to determine their decision-making when using alternative 
marketing arrangements (i.e. contractual arrangements and strategic beef alliances). In 
this study, beef cowherd size, the level of education and age significantly influenced 
producers’ participation decision in beef alliances. Further, when faced with a variety of 
beef alliances, smaller producers were more reluctant to make use of individual carcass 
data. As a result, policy makers interested in supporting the emergence of beef alliances 
need to recognize the diversity, such that support for alternative marketing arrangements 
needs to be targeted to different groups of producers. 
 
(5)  Based  on  our  survey  results,  cow-calf  producers’  preferences  for  attributes  of 
alternative  beef  alliances  are  in  the  following  order  (from  high  to  low):  information 
sharing  scheme,  sales  type,  production  protocols,  and  membership  fee.  These  results 
suggest that the design of an effective information sharing scheme as part of an overall 
compensation scheme is key for overcoming cow-calf producers’ reluctance for greater 
coordination in an environment of information asymmetry and unequal bargaining power 
between industry participants. These results also suggest that even if cattle feeders and 
packers appear to be better off by applying a value-based or grid pricing system (i.e., 
carcass,  individual  yield  &  grade  data),  a  grid  pricing  scheme  is  likely  to  fail  in 
improving vertical coordination in beef alliances when cow-calf producers are not truly 
integrated through effective information sharing schemes.   
II.5. Limitations and Further Research 
 
The inability to access a significant number of cow-calf producers outside of Alberta 
resulted in an over-sampling of Alberta producers. This was largely due to the fact that 
the regional beef associations were bound by their bylaws not to provide us access to 
their membership lists. A regionally diverse sample would have been highly desirable   31 
since  we  would  expect  that  different  regional  conditions  result  in  different  attitudes 
toward alternative marketing arrangements.  
 
A further limitation to this study relates to the  possible existence of hypothetical biases 
which  is  common  to  stated  preference  methods  (Bishop  and  Heberlein  1979). 
Hypothetical biases arise when a situation lacks realism or when respondents find the 
survey instrument too complex or lengthy. Although were able to use feedback from 
cow-calf producers during the development of the survey, we observed that the survey 
method (on-line vs. on-site) had a significant impact on the estimate results. Although the 
surveys were identical in design and presentation (the same on-line version of the survey 
was presented, either sent via email or else visible on a laptop), the fact that trained 
students helped cow-calf producers to complete the surveys on-site could have led to a 
systematic  bias.  Nevertheless,  we  believe  that  the  systematic  difference  in  responses 
between  both  producer  groups  is  more  likely  a  reflection  of  their  openness  for  new 
technologies and alternative risk-management strategies (the majority of respondents who 
completed the survey on-line choose to participate in beef alliances).    32 
III Risk and Risk Management 
III.1. Risk Background and Secondary Risk Measures 
Cattle production is risky due to the variability of returns from production risk and cattle 
marketing risk (Viney 1995). Production risk consists of un-predicted interest costs, feed 
conversions, feed costs, morbidity and mortality. Marketing risk on the other hand is 
represented by the variability of returns due to changes in cash market prices, futures 
market prices and basis levels (Viney 1995).
6 
 
Beef producers are managing risk through retained ownership, on-farm diversification, 
minimizing debt, government programs, or commodity specific derivative instruments.  
Alberta Agriculture, Food and Rural Development conducted a Cattle Herd Analysis in 
1999. This survey among other things explored the use of hedging techniques namely 
forward contracts, futures contracts and options contracts by beef cattle farmers to pre-
price weaned calves, feeder/grass cattle and slaughter cattle. Overall the results from the 
analysis  conducted  showed  that  hedging  techniques  are  not  popular  among  farmers 
(Unterschultz  2000).  Less  than  5%  of  cow-calf  producers  in  Alberta  used  futures  or 
options.  This  low  participation  rate  is  again  confirmed  with  the  results  found  in  this 
survey (Figure 10). 
 
CanFax  has  been  conducting  an  annual  survey  of  the  three  largest  packing  plants  in 
Alberta since 1998 to determine changes in trends in procuring fed steers and heifers. The 
procurement methods used by these packing plants include cash, grid or formula, forward 
contract and packer owned. The results are presented in Table 4. It is worth noting that 
the 2003 survey results showed some changes in patterns compared to 2002 (Grier 2005; 
CanFax 2004a; CanFax 2006; CanFax 2004b). Those changes likely reflect the changes 
in market conditions after the BSE crisis in May 2003. There were more cattle forward 
contracted or purchased on spot in 2003 as compared with 2002 (Table 4). After 2003, 
                                                 
6 Basis is the difference between the futures market price and the cash price on a specific day at a specific 
location.   33 
cattle bought on spot have been decreasing. Forward contracted cattle made up a much 
smaller percentage in 2005 at 4.1% compared to 8.4% in 2004 and 6.4% in 2003. Packer 
owned cattle and those bought using grid pricing in Alberta has been increasing except 
for 2003 when it fell in percentage points. Packer owned cattle accounted for 11.3% of 
the total in 2005 but this is lower as compared with the pre-BSE levels. Grid and/or 
formula cattle accounted for 20.8% in 2005.  
 
Table 4   Alberta Fed Cattle Marketing Methods: Years 1998-2005 
Marketing Method  1998 
( 
1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Cash   68%  68%  68%  60%  59.7%  66.3%  65.4%  63.8% 
Grid or Formula  10%  11%  13%  16%  19.5%  13.9%  15.5%  20.8% 
Forward Contracted   8%  6%  2%  5%  3%  6.4%  8.4%  4.1% 
Packer Owned   14%  15%  17%  19%  17.7%  13.4%  10.7%  11.3% 
 
Source:  Grier (2005, pp. 85); CanFax (2006).   
Data compiled by CanFax and is from the three largest packers in Alberta. 
Comparable data for the US for 2002 are 40% cash, 51% grid, 4% forward contracted 
and 5% packer owned (Schroeder 2003, pp. 12). 
 
The  dominant  reasons  identified  by  U.S.  cattle  producers  for  using  contract  and 
marketing agreements are to secure quality premiums, sell cattle for higher prices and 
reduce  price  risk  (Lawrence,  Schroeder,  and  Hayenga  2001).  The  packers’  identified 
quality  concerns  as  the  dominant  reasons  for  using  marketing  contracts  or  self 
production. The level of importance packers attach to managing price risk is lower as 
compared with cattle producers.  
 
Prior  research  conducted  to  investigate  slaughter  price  risk  management  in  finishing 
heavy  steers  in  a  custom  feedlot  in  Alberta  showed  that  hedging  100%  of  expected 
production using CME live cattle futures can reduce slaughter price risk but also reduces 
average  returns  (Unterschultz  1991).  This  conclusion  conflicts  with  previous  studies 
which argue that hedging live cattle in the futures markets often reduce returns while 
increasing price risk for cattle (Carter and Loyns 1985). Viney (1995) used alternative 
marketing  and  pricing  strategies  to  evaluate  the  risk  and  returns  to  cattle  feeding  in 
Alberta over the period 1980 to 1993. Production contracting strategies which eliminate   34 
basis  risk  were  found  to  provide  the  best  returns  in  a  market-based  risk-return 
comparison. Viney found that the use of put options did not add value to cattle feeding 
investments.  
 
Munro (1993) used historical simulation approaches to investigate the risk and return of 
retained ownership of steer calves past weaning in Alberta over the period 1979 to 1991. 
The  results  showed  that  using  the  futures  market  can  reduce  the  risk  and  in  some 
instances increase the revenues received. Selective hedging strategies, based on a target 
return  increased  returns  and  decreased  the  level  of  risk  exposure  but  these  selective 
hedging strategies can be costly. Routine hedging on the other hand does not appear to be 
desirable as a risk management tool if the production horizon is greater than 8 months.  
 
Noussinov and Leuthold (1999) concluded that following a regimented hedging plan 
substantially reduces cattle feeding price margin risks in the US. Lawrence and Smith 
(2001) evaluated alternatives by which US cattle feeders could manage price risk. Their 
findings showed that the cash market offered the greatest average return of any of the 
strategies  used.  The  next  highest  average return  strategy  was  hedging about  50% of 
expected production 50. Claus (2003) investigated the implications of combining feeding 
and packing margins into one alliance. Claus found that long hedging feeder cattle and 
short hedging live cattle improved the level of revenue and thus the profit to an alliance. 
Claus commented that the risk management strategies developed for the alliance as a 
whole could also be used by individual cattle owners and packers not involved in an 
alliance since the results for the feeding margin and packing margin are separable. 
Benefits of selling fed cattle on pricing grids include potential for higher prices (or fewer 
discounts)  if  cattle  meet  the  quality  specifications  that  bring  premiums  under  the 
particular grid. With grid pricing, producers bear the risk for all carcass characteristics. 
That is the risk of animal quality (yield and quality grades) is transferred from the packer 
to the seller (Ward, Schroeder, and Feuz 2002; Unterschultz et al. 2000). Prices paid to 
producers are based on the quality of animals slaughtered. Better quality cattle receive 
premiums and poorer quality cattle are discounted. 
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Feuz, Fausti, and Wagner (1995) comparing grid pricing to average pricing showed that 
marketing fed cattle at an average price typically results in lower revenues. Marketing fed 
cattle at an average price also reduces per head and per hundredweight (cwt) revenue 
variability relative to marketing fed cattle through a value-based pricing system such as 
grid pricing (Feuz, Fausti, and Wagner 1995; Feuz, Fausti, and Wagner 1993; Fausti, 
Feuz, and Wagner 1998). Thus less risk-averse cattle producers will more likely sell fed 
cattle  under  a  grid  pricing  mechanism  while  more  risk-averse  producers  may  prefer 
selling fed cattle at an average price.  
 
Anderson and Zeuli (2001) quantified the revenue variability differential between grid 
and live weight pricing of fed cattle using a simulated set of US cattle data. Their results 
indicate that marketing cattle on a grid would result in only a marginal increase (if any) in 
returns however grid pricing exposes the seller (cattle producer) to increased risk.  Fausti 
and  Qasmi  (2002)  used  weekly  grid  price  reports  over  the  period  January  1997  to 
December 2000 combined with carcass data on a set of 2,590 South Dakota slaughter 
steers to investigate barriers to the adoption of grid pricing by fed cattle producers. They 
concluded that grid pricing is a riskier marketing option for fed cattle producers relative 
to average pricing.  
 
The beef industry in Canada and US is characterized by automated processing facilities. 
Boxed beef is beef fabricated into primals, sub-primals or individual meat cuts, vacuum 
packaged and sold to retailers and wholesalers in boxes. Mattos et al. (2003) argued that 
retailers and wholesalers negotiate prices on a boxed beef cutout value rather than a 
carcass  sale.  Mattos  et  al.  (2003)  also  pointed  out  that  as  cutout  values  can  change 
independently of the live cattle futures prices, many of the participants in beef industry 
have been left without an adequate price risk management mechanism. Schroeder and 
Yang (2001) further demonstrated that the live cattle futures contract has not been an 
adequate risk management tool related to meat cuts. In general, low correlation between 
live cattle futures and meat cut prices, and related high basis risk has made effective risk 
transfer highly problematic. The findings of Mattos et al. (2003) is consistent with an 
earlier research by Schroeder and Yang (2001) which concluded that live cattle futures   36 
markets  do  not  give  much  opportunity  for  effective  wholesale  beef  cuts  price  risk 
management. In general low correlation between futures and meat cut prices, and related 
high basis risk has made effective risk transfer highly problematic. These conclusions 
would also suggest a low correlation between fed cattle cash prices and meat cut prices. 
   
Previous research suggests that risk management using futures and options may not be 
useful  at  the  cow  calf  level,  especially  in  Canada.  An  analysis  of  more  recent  data 
suggests  that  this  conclusion  has  not  changed  for  Canada.    Hedge  ratios
7  show  that 
Canadian producers of fed cattle, feeder cattle and calves may have difficulty effectively 
using the United States based futures markets for live cattle and feeder cattle.  The hedge 
ratios are often low and the hedge effectiveness is low, especially if Canada-US currency 
risk is ignored (Table 5).  The usefulness of these futures markets, as measured by the 
hedge effectiveness, during the period of June 2002 to June 2004 when the largest direct 
impacts of the BSE crisis were impacting Canada, was further reduced (Table 5).  Based 
on the results in Table 5 and prior research reported for the U.S., hedging Canadian 
cutout values using the CME live cattle futures or feeder futures would be ineffective.  
Price risk in cow-calf or backgrounder alliance contracts with prices or payments based 
in part on cutout values may not be effectively managed with the current set of market 
based risk tools available. 
 
 
                                                 
7 Hedge ratios are related to correlation between two markets.  A hedge ratio of 1 in fed cattle would 
suggest 1 futures contract to hedge 40,000 pounds of live fed cattle.  A hedge effectiveness close to zero 
suggest that little if any risk is removed by hedging.  A hedge effectiveness number near 1 suggests that 
most of the price risk is removed by hedging.  The feeder cattle futures contract is for 50,000 pounds.   37 
Table 5: Minimum Variance Hedge Ratios for Canadian Cattle Using the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange Nearby Live Cattle or Feeder Futures Contract. 
Canadian Cattle Type  Canadian 
Slaughter cattle 
and CME Live 
Cattle Futures 
Canadian feeders 
and CME feeder 
cattle futures  
Canadian calves and 
CME feeder cattle 
futures  
1992-June 2004 – Hedge 








1992- June 2004 –Hedge 








June 2002 to June 2004. 







-Data Source:  Canadian Cattle Prices: Cansim II (Statistics Canada).  US Futures Live 
Cattle Prices and Currency Prices from CRB database on futures prices.  All prices are 
monthly. 
-Hedge effectiveness in brackets.  Estimates developed using regression models of nearby 
futures with spot prices.  More sophisticated models and improved data may provide 
different results. 
 
III.2. Perceived Cow Herd Value Risk From Cow-Calf Survey 
The cow herd is a major asset in the cow-calf business. Data from the 2006 web-based 
and on-site survey of beef producers in western Canada were analyzed to provide an 
indirect measure of perceived risks at the cow-calf level. The specific objectives in this 
group of survey questions were to evaluate cow-calf producer perceptions’ of risk related 
to the asset value of their cow herd. Asset values of the cow herd are directly related to 
the value of calf sales and the cost of production. 
III.2.1 Survey Risk Questions Analyzed 
The respondents were asked to indicate how many years it takes for bred cow prices to 
return to the long run average price when cow prices are very low. Also the respondents 
were asked whether it would be extremely unlikely that the value of their cows wintered 
in  2007  would  be  a  certain  percentage  above  or  below  the  average  value  of  cows   38 
wintered. Answers to these questions were used to develop a subjective risk measure 
comparable to the standard volatility measure used in market based risk markets. The 
base results from survey questions are presented in Table 6.  
III.2.2 Risk Discussion 
An estimation of the volatility of returns indicates that overall the bred cow prices are 
somewhat volatile. Historical monthly Western Canada bred cow prices from Canfax 
over the period January 2000 to May 2003 suggest the risk (estimated volatility) is 25.8% 
annually.  This measure of risk from secondary data can be compared to the perceived 
risk results from the survey. 
 
Following Copeland and Antikarov, (2003) cow prices are assumed to follow a mean 
reverting  stochastic  process.  First,  the  average  bred  cow  price  around  which  the 
uncertainty fluctuates was determined and used as a proxy for the value of cow wintered. 
Copeland and Antikarov, (2003 pp. 259-264) illustrated how the volatility estimate is 
computed given the expected value of prices around which the uncertainty fluctuates, the 
speed  with  which  the  uncertainty  returns  to  the  average  after  every  long  term  price 
deviation as well as the upper and lower bound prices. On average producers estimate 
that it takes approximately 2.8 years for the price of bred cows to return to the long run 
average when there is a major price shock to cow prices. (Table 6)  
 
The results calculated from the producer responses and presented in Table 7 indicate 
producers perceive that the risk they face in the asset value of their cow herd is about 
75% lower (i.e. 4.2% to 6.8% as compared to empirical estimates (25.8%) on risk in cow 
values). Total overall perceived price risk (i.e. total volatility) does not increase quickly 
(i.e. 5 years) given perceptions about longer run trends in cow price directions.  However 
these results need to be interpreted with caution since over 50% of the survey respondents 
did not answer these particular questions. 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics on the Producer Responses to the Risk Questions and 
Other Data 
   N  Minimum  Maximum  Mean  Std. Deviation 
Expprice (years)*  150  0  10  2.84  1.572 
Mvexpea (%)*  151  0  100  12.65  19.363 
Mvexpeb (%)*  151  0  95  11.54  17.544 
WCBCprices ($)**  41  768.75  1237.59  1067.97  100.63 
   
Expprice – number of years it takes for market prices for bred cows to return to the average. 
Mvexpea - % above the value of cow herd wintered (used as an upper bound value). 
Mvexpeb - % below the value of cow herd wintered (used as a lower bound value). 
WCBCprices – Western Canada bred cow prices 
* - Source: Survey Data 
** - Source:  CANFAX – Monthly data (January 2000 – May 2003)  
 
Table 7: Perceived Risk of Cow Herd Values by Cow-Calf Producers 
  Annual Risk 
(Volatility) 
Risk (Volatility) Over a  5 Year Time 
Horizon With Reversion 




Upper bound  Lower bound 
         
Average market price risk 
(volatility) per producer 
4.2%  6.8%  5.5% (9.5%)**  8.8% (15.2%) 
*Upper  bound  is  shock  to  cow  values  that  increases  the  price  of  cows  substantially.  
Lower bound is a shock to cow prices that decreases the value of cows substantially. 
**  This  assumes  that  in  slightly  less  than  three  years,  cow  prices  return  to  long-run 
averages if there is a price shock. Numbers in brackets are estimates of this risk over five 
years when producers are not sure that prices will ever return to an average price in the 
future. 
 
III.3 Risk Conclusions 
The risk analysis, while preliminary, suggests the following regarding managing risk in 
alliance contracts.  Grid or cutout pricing schemes will increase price risk to the cow calf 
producer if incorporated into contract compensation schemes.  Managing these grid or 
cutout prices with current risk tools such as futures contracts will not be overly successful 
at a backgrounder or cow calf level.  A different set of risk management tools or risk-
based  compensation  schemes  may  be  required  to  manage  these  risks  if  cow-calf 
producers share the risk of fed cattle prices, grid prices or meat cut out prices in the   40 
alliances  contracts.  However,  it  is  likely  that  even  a  different  set  of  such  tools  and 
compensation schemes is not sufficient in isolation. We have evidence that risk-based 
compensation  schemes  may  need  to  be  considered  as  part  of  a  larger  set  of 
complementary  factors,  such  that  the  latter  need  to  be  aligned  in  the  search  for 
competitive beef alliances (value chains) that offer fair returns to all participants (Steiner 
2007).  The challenge remains thus to provide a set of risk-management tools that is 
useful for the entire industry, while supporting individual beef alliances (value chains) to 
differentiate themselves through an idiosyncratic mix of such complementary resources 
and capabilities. 
 
On a related issue, cow-calf producers may view the risk associated with the value of 
their cow herd as being much lower than the actual market risk.  It may be useful to 
explore producer perceptions of risk versus actual risk in other aspects of the supply 
chain to align risk.  If perceived risks and actual risks are misaligned it may be difficult to 
design contracts that share risks among alliance members in an “equitable” fashion. A 
more objective assessment of actual risks may be imperative to help overcome the deep-
rooted  distrust  that  seems  to  prevail  at  the  producer  level  with  regards  to  feedlot 
operators, packers and retailers. 
 
IV. Price Spread and Imperfect competition in the 




Concerns about the lack of competition in the Canadian beef processing industry have 
precipitated a series of hearings and reports from both the legislative and executive arms 
of  government
8.  Most  of  these  reports  however  refute  the  claims  and  allegations  of 
market power by the packing plants and blame the impasse in the market on border 
closure  following  the  simple  theory  of  demand  and  supply.  It  is  possible  that  the 
Canadian packing industry has seen extraordinary profits since the BSE crisis as one 
                                                 
8The Canadian International Trade Tribunal, The Federal Standing Senate Committee of Agriculture and 
Forestry and The Canadian Competition Bureau   41 
report observed that the three major packers in Alberta saw a 281% increase in profit 
margin  after  May  2003  (Report  of  the  Auditor  General  on  the  Alberta  government’s 
BSE-related assistance programs, July 27, 2004). 
 
In  September  2003,  the  packers  were  able  to  resume  exports  of  boxed  beef  into  the 
lucrative  U.S.  market;  even  though  live  cattle  exports  were  prohibited.  Hence,  cattle 
prices  remained  low  while  export  and  retail  beef  prices  resumed  normal  trajectories. 
Figure 15 below summarizes the situation in the beef industry as regards beef packers’ 
consolidation in Canada.  
 
Figure.15 Distribution of cattle slaughtering activity and the top 4 plants market 









































% of total FIS Average kill/plant/year No. of plants
 
Source:   Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Cattle Slaughter Statistics for Federal Abattoirs  





This part of the report aims to provide an analysis on price spreads, by animal, age and 
sex for Canada and the U.S. To achieve our objective it is necessary is to develop a 
consistent carcass weight equivalent data set for cattle by age and sex and estimate price   42 
spreads  between  the  different  market  levels-  farm,  packer/processor  and  retail,  and 
determine the impact of different economic factors on price spreads. The hypothesis of a 
structural  change  in  these  relationships  in  May  2003  will  also  be  tested  for  Canada. 
Previous studies that have analyzed competition issues and price-cost margin differentials 
include Scott (1983), Beck and Mozejko (1992), Liu (1991), Cranfield (1995), Cranfield 
and  Goddard  (1999),  Druhan  (1992),  Zhou  (1991),  Unterschultz  et.  al.  (1997),  and  
Quagrainie et al. (2003).  
 
IV.3. Theory  
 
A complete theory of price spread (or market margin relationships) assumes simultaneous 
equilibrium at two or more market levels in an industry. The forces of demand and supply 
at the retail level determine retail prices, and demand at the producer (farm gate) level, 
and primary supply determine producer prices. The price spread behaviour is determined 
by  the  difference  between  the  two  prices.  Wholesale  prices  are  determined  from 
equilibrium in demand and supply at intermediate market levels if the analysis is to cover 
more  than  two  market  levels.  Firm  level  behaviour  at  farm  (primary  supply), 
processor/retailer (farm level demand, retail level supply) and consumer behaviour at 
retail  drive  the  economics  of  price  spreads.  For  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  the 
underlying theory, see Appendix 2, section A2.1.. 
 
IV.4. Data and Method 
 
The importance of accurate and consistent data in any empirical investigation of price 
spread behavior cannot be over emphasized (Scott 1983). Scott (1983) was able to build 
spatial/ continental price spread behavioral models for red meat in Eastern and Western 
Canada, and the U.S. Specifically, price spread data was developed between the farm and 
packer level, and the packer and retail level for steers, heifers, cows and beef. The results   43 
of her price spread behavioural analysis over the 1970’s revealed levelling
9 of the farm to 
packer price spread and averaging of the packer to retail price spread. Processing costs, 
by-product  values  and  dynamic  adjustments  were  found  to  explain  these  spread 
behaviours.  
 
In  an  attempt  to  capture  variability  and  differences  in  production  patterns  we  follow 
Cranfield and Goddard (1999) and Martin and Haack (1977) in categorizing the cattle 
and beef market into regions as follows: Western Canada, Eastern Canada and the U.S.. 
Monthly data is used for this analysis so as to reflect the dynamics of modeling and thus 
improve  empirical  estimations.  Since  one  of  the  purposes  of  this  investigation  is  to 
capture the effect of BSE in relation to its effect on the Canadian cattle beef industry, the 
estimations and tests are done in two different periods: pre and post BSE, that is from 
January, 1980-May, 2005 when North America had the first BSE case, and from June, 
2003 to December, 2005 respectively. 
                                                                        
 
For the sake of valid comparisons across the different market levels, coupled with the fact 
that beef carcasses go through processing before the final product is sold at retail stores, 
an acceptable standard unit of measurement becomes necessary. Following Scott’s (1983) 
estimation and method, the chilled and trimmed fresh carcass by weight, prior to any 
further processing is used as a standard unit of product for constructing cattle/beef price 
spreads. All prices of cattle/beef at all levels will be expressed as Canadian cents per 
pound of chilled carcass, by weight. Following previous analyses ((Cramon-Taubadel 
(1998), Holloway (1991), Gardner (1975)), nominal prices are used throughout because 
our focus is on price behavior across market levels in an industry. 
 
                                                 
9Price levelling is defined by Watson and Parish (1982) as being the practice whereby retailers vary margins to smooth 
retail prices over time in the face of fluctuating sale yard and wholesale prices, while price averaging is the practice of 
averaging margins through spreading costs across all classes of meat in order to minimize the extent of an individual 
price change.  
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Data used are monthly observations for the period 1980-2005 of retail, wholesale and 
farm prices of steers, heifers and cows, and their respective quantities. Canada is split 
into West and East because of regional differences in the structure and trade relationships 
in the two regions. The same data is collected for the US cattle/beef sector since both 
countries trade in the North American cattle/beef industry.  
 
Other data includes prices of by-products for the three cattle sexes and types, pork CPI as 
one  proxy  for  a  close  substitute  to  beef,  the  industrial  products  price  index  for 
intermediate  slaughtering  and  processing  in  the  packing  industry  as  a  proxy  for 
processing costs; and a raw material price index as a proxy for retail costs of marketing. 
Exchange rates between the US. and Canada were collected as well as carcass weights for 
the different class and sex of cattle. Data were all sourced from the CANSIM database of 
Statistics  Canada,  Agricultural  and  Agri-food  Canada  (AAFC)  Canada  Livestock  and 
Meat Trade Reports, George Morris Centre, Canfax Statistical data. Other data sources 
include the Economic Research Service (ERS) agency of the USDA data bases. A brief 
description of data and sources is presented in Appendix II.2.. A detailed description of 
the underlying model is provided in Appendix II.3.. 
 
 
IV.5. Estimation results 
 
Figure 16 shows the evolution of cow prices in Canada and the US. 
 
The estimated price spreads for all steers, heifers and cows for Eastern and Western 
Canada, and the U.S. are presented graphically in Figures 17 to 22. The figures show that 
all price spreads generally trend upward, where the Canadian spread is moving upward 
faster than that of the U.S.. Price spreads in the U.S. are lower than in Canada and the 
spread  between  the  farm-wholesale  is  generally  lower  as  compared  to  that  between 
wholesale and retail. The opposite is the case in Canada where spreads between farm-
wholesale are sometimes double the farm price but the spreads between wholesale to 
retail are smaller. 
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In May 2003, there appears to be a structural break in each animal category, which saw 
plummeting prices in all market levels. Canadian producer, wholesale and retail prices of 
steers and heifers fell by about 37 percent, 17 percent and 4 percent respectively. The 
prices of cows fell by more than 60 percent after May 2003 due to the long term ban on 
trading live animals which particularly affected cows above thirty months of age. These 
percentages were also maintained for the first three months of the total ban on Canadian 
cattle and beef, after which the conditions for the wholesalers and retailers improved 
without any corresponding increase in farm prices. This is because the Canada-US border 
was opened to beef and beef products three months after the imposition of the ban and the 
ban on live cattle remained until July 2005. The figures also show the magnitude of the 
losses incurred by participants at the different market levels in Canada and the gains 
made by the same types of participants in the United States. Capacity utilization also 
picked up in both countries; an indication of the increase in supply of cattle and the   46 
enhancement in processing technology. Capacity utilization rates also suggest that there 
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Farm Wholesale Retail Farm-Wholesale Wholesale-Retail
 
 
The evolution of Canadian cattle prices during the first three months after the BSE 
incidence are presented in Figure 23 and 24. 
 
Fig. 23. Price loss following the First Three Months of BSE Incidence in Canada  























































Steers  50 
Fig. 24 Price gain in the U.S. following the First Three Months of BSE Incidence  























Figure 25 shows the capacity utilization rates of meat processing/ packing plants for both 
the U.S. and Canada.  
 
Fig.25 Meat packing/processing plants capacity utilization rates in Canada and the 
















































































































































































































































Canada US  51 
The  summary  descriptive  statistics  for  the  data  is  presented  in  Tables  8  to  10.  The 
extraordinary increase in the mean of prices for wholesale and retail market levels after 
the BSE shock is evident. Meanwhile, the decrease in the mean of the farm prices is 
indicative of a loss at the farm level. The standard deviation, a measure of the spread of a 
distribution, indicates that for the wholesale and retail price variables, there are large 
deviations  from  the  mean  and  small  deviation  on  the  farm  price  from  the  mean. 
Considering the data before and after BSE, it is evident that the wholesale and retail 
variability of price setting behavior has been declining for all animal types, given the 
large decrease in the standard deviation after BSE. In comparison, the farm prices have, 
on average, either remained the same or become slightly more variable as seen in the data 
for Western Canada.  
 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics; Farm, Wholesale and Retail Heifer Prices for Canada in  
              Cents/lb chilled carcass (1980-2005) 
Observations             Mean                            Median                         St. deviation
     West       East      West      East      West      East
Farm Price (FP) 312.00 86.79 90.93 85.50 90.15 11.12 10.50
Before BSE 281.00 87.32 92.30 85.60 91.10 10.99 9.72
After BSE 32.00 81.92 78.49 85.50 78.30 11.32 9.15
Wholesale Price(WP) 312.00 189.63 189.63 187.75 187.75 51.49 51.49
Before BSE 281.00 181.72 181.72 180.30 180.30 47.98 47.98
After BSE 32.00 261.32 261.32 264.00 264.00 10.09 10.09
Retail Beef price(RP) 312.00 274.85 274.85 285.60 285.60 81.59 81.59
Before BSE 281.00 262.54 262.54 282.80 282.80 76.39 76.39
After BSE 32.00 386.46 386.46 388.20 388.20 15.64 15.64
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Observations                  Mean                                   Median                               St. deviation
    West     East     US     West     East     US     West     East     US
Farm Price (FP) 312.00 90.63 93.27 124.26 89.70 92.50 120.85 10.42 10.12 16.65
Before BSE 281.00 91.66 94.61 121.28 91.30 93.40 119.10 9.78 9.29 14.28
After BSE 32.00 81.26 81.13 151.20 85.20 81.30 151.20 11.49 9.28 11.69
Wholesale Price(WP) 312.00 189.63 189.63 145.87 187.75 187.75 138.25 51.49 51.49 22.35
Before BSE 281.00 181.72 181.72 141.94 180.30 180.30 136.80 47.98 47.98 19.09
After BSE 32.00 261.32 261.32 181.53 264.00 261.32 178.60 10.09 10.09 17.76
Retail Beef price(RP) 312.00 274.85 274.85 237.94 285.60 285.60 231.25 81.59 81.59 52.52
Before BSE 281.00 262.54 262.54 228.39 282.80 282.80 212.80 76.39 76.39 45.89
After BSE 32.00 386.46 386.46 324.50 388.20 388.20 326.90 15.64 15.64 18.42
By-product Prices 312.00 12.88 13.65 15.31 12.70 13.80 15.35 2.53 2.46 2.53
Before BSE  281.00 12.93 13.86 15.23 13.10 14.10 15.30 2.66 2.51 2.61




Table 10: Descriptive Statistics; Farm, Wholesale and Retail Cow Prices for Canada and the U.S. in cents/lb chilled carcass (1980-2005) 
Observations     West     East       US     West     East       US     West      East      US
Farm Price (FP) 312.00 56.17 57.91 92.70 57.65 60.55 90.15 12.41 12.29 12.42
Before BSE 281.00 59.23 61.40 90.48 58.70 61.30 88.90 8.58 6.45 10.65
After BSE 32.00 28.41 26.30 112.81 27.50 26.30 112.80 5.12 5.49 8.73
Wholesale Price(WP) 312.00 189.63 196.10 108.83 187.75 213.06 103.10 51.49 39.90 16.67
Before BSE 281.00 181.72 188.88 105.89 180.30 213.06 102.10 47.98 35.12 14.25
After BSE 32.00 261.32 261.00 135.43 264.00 257.03 133.30 10.09 10.08 13.25
Retail Beef price(RP) 312.00 250.69 265.42 177.68 260.10 281.53 194.52 74.17 46.84 39.14
Before BSE 281.00 239.50 265.09 170.55 256.10 275.10 187.70 69.45 38.47 34.19
After BSE 32.00 352.09 352.09 242.09 355.50 342.30 242.80 14.73 14.74 13.74
 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics; Farm, Wholesale, Retail Steer Prices for Canada and U.S. in cents/lb chilled carcass (1980-2005)   53 
Tables A3.1 to A3.11. in Appendix 3 contain the unrestricted estimates for each of the cattle classes for the U.S, eastern and western 
Canada, with three equations for price spreads, farm/wholesale and Wholesale/ retail demand and farm commodity supply. The signs of 
parameter estimates are in line with those from Holloway (1991) and Wohlgenant (1989). The market demand (retail or wholesale) 
variables appear to have a positive impact on prices and a negative impact on spreads. The commodity supply variable was somewhat 
less significant across equations, but where it was significant, it had the expected negative impact on farm, wholesale and retail prices.
10 
 
We tested for perfect competition in the marketing of the three classes of animals considered for both Canada and the U.S. Both 
restrictions for the necessary and sufficient conditions for perfect competition were imposed and tested, and the results are presented in 
Table A3.1. When the first restriction necessary for perfect competition is imposed, we find not a uniform assessment of market 
structure across animals and regions. It is more difficult to reject the restriction that θ = 0 after BSE than before BSE in all three regions.  
With the imposition of the second restriction necessary for perfect competition, the statistical test for perfect competition is rejected 
more  frequently  prior  to  BSE  in  Canada  and  never  after  BSE.  Similar  results  occur  for  the  U.S.  where  results  show  imperfect 
competition  prior  to  the  incidence  of  BSE  in  North  America,  and  more  frequently  than  Canada,  in  the  second  period  under 
consideration. It is worth noting that the statistical tests for perfect competition after BSE could, in most cases, not be rejected, across all 
regions and animals. 
 
Significant structural breaks can be seen across most of the US market levels and animal types in May of 2003. This is evident in the 
large values for the Chow test, particularly in the retail level prices and wholesale retail level spreads. It is surprising that this study did 
not find significant evidence of structural changes in the Canadian markets where BSE had (and continues to have) negative effects on 
cattle and beef prices. Our findings suggest that the underlying relationships have not changed structurally, although the levels of prices 
have clearly changed.  
                                                 
10 The Durbin’s-h (D-h) statistics shows that first-order correlation of our variables doesn’t seem to be a problem in the model.   54 
IV.6. Conclusions and Implications  
 
We have estimated price spreads and developed hypotheses to test for imperfect competition in 
the Canadian and U.S. beef cattle industry. The theory of conjectural variations formed the 
basis of the analysis, using prices and cost indices as the core structural variables. Consistent 
price spread data based on chilled carcass weight was developed for all classes of cattle and 
beef, and was used to estimate price-cost spreads among the three different market levels. 
While there were no noticeable differences between western and eastern regions of Canada, 
large disparities in spreads were found between Canada and the US. Competition issues were 
not too dissimilar in the two countries with some evidence of imperfect competition pre-BSE 
(1980-  May,  2003)  in  Canada  and  US,  but  much  less  evidence  after  May  2003  in  both 
countries.  
 
Further analysis in terms of estimating the models in first differences of logarithms (imposing 
constant  elasticities  over  the  estimation  period)  might  provide  additional  clarity  on  the 
determinants of price spreads and issues of market power. Further structural modeling with 
endogenous cattle supply, slaughter and trade would also enhance the analysis. Our results 
suggest that further work is needed at the wholesale level. Further, firm level data is desirable 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table  A1.1.  Summary  of  Statistical  Results  of  the  Logit  Model  (Beef  Alliance 
Participation)  
    Coefficient  Standard Error  Marginal Effects  Expected Sign 
Constant  4.08**  1.17   0.51***  N/A 
Survey Type  -1.38**  0.67   -0.17**  N/A 
Producer Type  -1.28*  0.68   -0.15***  - 
Age  1.11*  0.58   0.14*  + 
Beef Cowherd Size  -2.30**  0.77   -0.35***  - 
Education  -1.02*  0.63   -0.13*  - 
Income  0.15   0.67   0.02   N/A 
Information Activity  0.69   0.65   -0.17   + 
Retained Ownership  -1.39*  0.81   0.09*  + 
Contracting Farming  0.54   0.57   0.07   + 
Log Likelihood  -44.36      
Restricted Log 
Likelihood  -60.15      
ҳ
2  31.58      
P-Value  0.00      
McFadden’s R
2  0.26      
No. of Observations  110          
** Significant at the 5% significance level. ***Significant at the 1% significance level. Marginal effects are 
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Table A1.2. Summary of Statistical Results of  the Choice Experiment 
Model 1  Model 2 
Variables  Descriptions 
Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error 
S1  Sell to alliance, NO profit 
sharing  -0.34**  0.15   -0.42***  0.16  
S2  Sell to alliance, bonuses based 
on animal performance  0.37   0.24   0.43*  0.25  
S3  Retain Ownership, No profit 
sharing  -0.18  0.20  -0.19  0.21 
S4  Retain ownership, profit 
sharing  0.15   0.17   0.18   0.17  
D1  Live performance, per pen  -0.21  0.14  -0.23  0.14 
D2  live performance, individual 
data  0.70***  0.21   0.43**  0.22  
D3  Carcass, group data  -0.53***  0.18   -0.41**  0.18  
D4  carcass, individual yield & 
grade data  0.04   0.16   0.20   0.17  
P1 
No restrictions on vaccination 
and use of antibiotics & No 
min. number of animals 
required 
-0.12  0.16  -0.10  0.17 
P2 
No restrictions on vaccination 
and use of antibiotics & min. 
number of animals required 
0.08   0.16   0.14   0.16  
P3 
Restrictions on vaccination and 
use of antibiotics & No min. 
number of animals required 
0.05   0.17   -0.01   0.17  
P4 
Restrictions on vaccination and 
use of antibiotics & min. 
number of animals required 
0.00   0.18   -0.04   0.18  
FEE  $0,$5,$10,$20  -0.02**  0.01   -0.02**  0.01  
SRT  Survey Method:1=on-
site;otherwise,0          0.75***  0.20  
Log-likelihood  -215.05       -208.08      
Restricted Log-likelihood  -231.37     -231.37    
The log-likelihood ratio test  32.64     46.58    
McFadden R
2  0.07       0.10      
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Appendix 2 
 
Appendix 2.1.: Theory Surrounding Price Spreads and Market Power 
 
 
Scott (1983) defines price spread as the difference between the primary and derived demand 
curves for a product. Alternatively, price spreads are the difference between the prices two 
market  levels  in  an  industry  per  equivalent  unit  at  equilibrium,  and  represent  the  price  of 
marketing  services  such  as  processing,  storage,  wholesaling  and  retailing.    The  primary 
demand is joint demand for all the inputs that have gone into the final product while the 
derived  demand  is  the  demand  schedule  for  inputs  used  to  produce  a  consumer  product. 
Therefore  price  spreads  represents  the  difference  between  the  two  demands.  A  perfectly 
competitive industry graphical representation of the relationship between primary and derived 
demand and supply and the resulting price spread is shown in figure XX. 
 
Price spreads behavior depends upon the slopes of the demand and supply functions relative to 
each other. Using Gardner’s (1975) theoretical framework, a perfectly competitive firm uses an 
agricultural commodity and marketing services to produce food, and retail food demand is 
determined by the retail price and exogenous demand shifters-such as income or prices of 
alternate products.  
 
Figure A2.1. Primary and Derived Demand and Supply Under Perfect Competition 
 




Neoclassical  consumer  theory  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  resources  are  scarce  and 
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Marshallian demand functions are a function of  prices of the goods consumed, income, prices 
of substitutes, and other  variables that might affect the demand for such good(s).   
 
In accordance with Gardner (1975), the primary demand for a retail food, say beef, can be 
written as: 
    X = D (Px, N),               (1) 
 
where Px is the retail price of the commodity and N is an arbitrary exogenous demand shifter 
which in this case, population is used as in Wohlgenant (1989).  
 
On the industry side, the theory of the firm is based on the assumption that firms maximize 
profits subject to a production function that involves the use of inputs to produce outputs. This 
theory results in an output supply function and input demand functions for the firm at the point 
of profit maximization. 
 
Thus competitive firms do the following: 
    Max. Π = PyY - PxX – F,       
    Subject to  X= f (a , b)                                                           (2) 
 
Resulting in:  S = f (Py , Px )  and D = f (Py , Px )                                                    (3) 
 
where Py and  Px are output and input prices respectively, F is the fixed cost, and a and b are 
inputs, say cattle and other marketing inputs, used in producing the firm’s output.  
 
At profit maximization in a competitive market, firms would demand inputs a and b when 
thevalue of their marginal product equals their respective prices. That is, 
 
Pa = Px . Mpa  (4) 
and, 
Pb = Px . Mpb  (5) 
 
Therefore, the supply equations emanating from (4) and (5) are   65 
Pa = m (a; W),                       (6) 
 
    Pb = n (b; T).                         (7) 
 
(6) is the inverse supply function of the a output and (7) is the supply function  of b to the  firm 
or the input demand function of the firm. W and T are the exogenous shifters of the supply of a 
and b as defined in Gardner (1975). 
 
Six  equations  (1,2,4,5,6,7)  are  used  to  solve  for  equilibrium  for  the  endogenous  variables 
(prices and quantities at two market levels).  
 
In  a  perfectly  competitive  market,  prices  will  be  related  directly  to  marginal  costs.  In  an 
imperfectly competitive market, price spreads between farm and retail can be wider than in 
other markets (Holloway, 1991).  
 
In order to introduce imperfect competition and to test for the hypothesis of market power, a 
conjectural  variation  model  can  be  included  in  the  estimation  process  in  calculating  the 
different demand aand supply elasticities (Holloway, 1991). It is assumed that the firm (likely 
the processing firm)  forms beliefs about the extent to which their strategic behavior affects the 
quantity decisions of other firms in the industry when making their output decisions.  Several 
studies
11  have  addressed  the  issues  of  market  power  using  this  approach.  Although  the 
approach  is  not  without  shortcomings,  it  can  provide  a  useful  initial  characterization  of 
economic behaviour in the North American beef/cattle sector. 
 
This  concept  as  presented  by  Appelbaum  (1982)  includes  the  maximization  of    the  profit 
function of a firm in an industry with N firms producing homogeneous products, Y. 
 
Max Π 
j =  P·Y 
j – C 
j(Y 
j , Wi )              (8) 
 
                                                 
11 Appelbaum (1982), Lopez (1984), Shroeter (1988),  Azzam et al. (1990, 1995, 1996)   66 
where P is the output price and Y 
j the firm’s output quantity,  P·Y 
j is the revenue function;  Y 
j 
is the firm’s output and  Wi is the firm’s input cost while C 
j(Y 
j , Wi) is the firm’s cost function. 
 
Taking the first derivative of the profit equation yields the CV elasticity, a measure of market 
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where   θ









 ,        (10) 
 the conjectural variation elasticity for firm j and  
 








h    ,                 (11) 
the own price elasticity of demand for the retail product in the industry. MC is the firms’ 
marginal cost. 
 
In equation (9), the two extremes of θ are easily estimated as perfect competition if θ=0 or 
monopoly, or cartel behavior if θ=1. However, as Holloway mentions, the closed definition of 
θ gives it any intermediate value reflecting Cournot behavior. Hence, θ  Î[ ] 1 , 0  provides a 
convenient index of competition within which a broad spectrum of behaviors can be captured. 
 
It is important to note that the assumptions that firms possess homogeneous technologies and 
produce homogeneous products result in the fact that   x P MC,  and h are common to all firms 
in each region. Therefore  , q q q = = j i  "  j i,  Î{ } n ,..., 2 , 1 . 
 
 
Appendix 2.2.: Data 
 
Farm Level Data 
 
Price  series  for  A1/A2  steers  and  heifers,  and  D1/D2  cows  at  Toronto  and  Calgary  were 
collected for the last week of the month. Data for 1980-1990 were obtained from the Canada 
Livestock and Meat Trade Report on pages 15-16 titled: Average prices for selected classes   67 
and grades of cattle (hard copies from Department of Rural Economy resource room) and for 
1991-2005  were  obtained  online  from  the  AAFC  website: 
http://www.agr.gc.ca/redmeat/almrcalendar.htm.  It  is  titled  “Livestock  market  review-
Annual livestock and meat report schedule” with table titled: slaughter cattle monthly average 
cattle prices per 100 lbs. In order to adjust farm prices of cattle in dollars per hundred weights 
live to a chilled carcass equivalent, dressing and cooler shrink percentages were used.  
A1/A2 steer/heifer or D1/D2 cow carcass equivalent for Ontario/Alberta = Monthly prices in 
$/cwt live + dressing percentage and cooler shrink percentage. 
A constant value for both dressing and cooler shrink percentages as used by Scott (1982) was 
used due to lack of varying historic data. Specific warm carcass dressing percentage according 
to  grades and  associated  cooling  percentage
12  and  the  1976  beef  inquiry  report
13  provided 
chilled carcass dressing percentage for steers, heifers and cows (see table below). 
   
Chilled Beef carcass dressing Percentages 
A1/A2 steer carcass equivalent = A1/A2 steer price in cents/cwt live + 0.558 (dressing % 
Ontario                                   & cooler shrink % 
A1/A2 steer carcass equivalent = A1/A2 steer price in cents/cwt live + 0.553 (dressing % 
Alberta                                   & cooler shrink % 
A1/A2 heifer carcass equivalent = A1/A2 steer price in cents/cwt live + 0.541(dressing % 
Ontario                                   & cooler shrink % 
A1/A2 heifer carcass equivalent = A1/A2 steer price in cents/cwt live + 0.537(dressing % 
Alberta                                   & cooler shrink % 
A1/A2 cow carcass equivalent = A1/A2 steer price in cents/cwt live + 0.498 (dressing % 
Ontario                                   & cooler shrink % 
A1/A2 cow carcass equivalent = A1/A2 steer price in cents/cwt live + 0.485 (dressing % 
Alberta                                   & cooler shrink % 
 
                                                 
12 Sourced from Dr. R. Osborne, University of Guelph, Department of Animal Science. 
13 Richard Daniels (1976). Farm to Retail Price Spreads for Beef in Canada. Commision  of inquiry into the 
   marketing of beef and veal , Report 2, Ottawa.   68 
Packer Level Data 
Data for the six major cuts (brisket, shank, flank, ribs, square cut chuck, loin and hip) that 
constitute the carcass weight of a beef carcass as recognized by the Canadian Beef Information 
Centre
14 were used to calculate the wholesale prices. The Montreal wholesale prices of beef 
cuts as reported by the Canada Livestock and Meat Trade Report (1980-1990), page 3 titled: 
Wholesale prices-primal and sub-primal beef cuts, and 1991-2005 from the AAFC website, 
http://www.agr.gc.ca/redmeat/almrcalendar.htm. It is titled “Livestock market review-Annual 
livestock and meat report schedule” with table titled: Montreal wholesale prices - Primal and 
Sub-primal Beef Cuts and Fresh Pork 
 To build a composite carcass from these cuts, we use the following formula: 
Packer (wholesale) price in cents/lb chilled carcass weight = major cut price in Cents/lb X 
(percentage composition of cut in carcass X respective carcass weight). 
Respective constant percentages of cuts used are as follows:  
·  Brisket = 6 % of carcass by weight 
·  Shank = 4 % of carcass by weight 
·  Flank = 6 % of carcass by weight 
·  Square cut Chuck = 29% of carcass by weight 
·  Rib = 11 % of carcass by weight 
·  Loin = 21 % of carcass by weight 
·  Hip = 23 % of carcass by weight 
 
Retail Level Data  
Percentage yield from a chilled carcass estimated for all retail cuts from beef carcass is used to 
estimate retail carcass value. Due to restrictions imposed by data availability, six retail cuts 
from Statistics Canada CANSIM II database
15 from the University of Alberta library are used 
for both Ontario and Alberta. These cuts are: sirloin steak, round steak, prime rib roast, blade 
                                                 
14http://www.beefinfo.org/retail_specs.cfm. check view detailed carcass and specs to see wholesale cuts 
percentages  
15 Cansim II tables 3260012: Average retail prices for food and other selected items 
Full brisket 16%   69 
roast, stewing beef and ground beef. This six retail cuts account for 48% of the carcass weight. 
The Daniel’s (1976) unpublished correlation research of 21 beef cuts as used in Scott (1983) is 
used to develop a weighing scheme allowing the six cuts to approximate the total retail value 
of the carcass. Daniel correlated 87 time series observations of the six cut prices with twenty 
one beef cuts in Toronto.   
The resultant weighing scheme for high quality beef (A1and A2 steers & heifers) retail cuts for 
Toronto and Calgary is given below: 
Sirloin steak    18.53 % of the packers carcass weight 
Round steak    10.62 % of the packers carcass weight 
Prime rib roast   6.74 %  of the packers carcass weight 
Blade roast    12.54 %  of the packers carcass weight 
Stewing beef    20.40 % of the packers carcass weight 
Hamburger    6.72 %  of the packers carcass weight 
75.55% 
The remaining 25% made up of bones (13%), fat (10%) and shrink (2%). 
 
For low quality cow beef (economy beef), data on cutting test from Steinberg of Montréal is 
correlated using the D. Ricard’s method to arrive at a weighting scheme for retail cuts in 
Toronto and Calgary as shown below: 
Sirloin steak    15.22 % of the packers carcass weight 
Round steak    12.74 % of the packers carcass weight 
Prime rib roast   6.16 % of the packers carcass weight 
Blade roast    15.88 % of the packers carcass weight 
Stewing beef    1.57 % of the packers carcass weight 
Hamburger    25.40% of the packers carcass weight 
77.05% 
Retail prices in cents/lb in chilled packer carcass = retail quoted price of cut in cents/lb X (% 
composition of cut in carcass X respective Carcass weight). 
 
By-product prices from CANFAX were divided by respective carcass weights for Alberta and 
Ontario steers and multiplied by a 100 to arrive at the values in cents/ pound chilled carcass   70 
packer value. Data from 1980 to 1991 is obtained from Canada Livestock and Meat Trade 
Report, page 8 in table titled-Total by-product price (dressed carcass basis $ per 100 pounds) 
(hard copies from Department of Rural Economy resource room), and 1992-2005 are high 
price by-product values in $ per head steer report by CANFAX from Kevin Grier, Senior 
Market Analyst of the George Morris Centre (see attached excel file titled: Raw BP) 
 
In the U.S. case, the spreads is already calculated in US cents per pound retail weight as found 
in the USDA, ERS website
16 on meat price spreads data set titled: Historical monthly price 
spread data for beef, pork, broilers, turkeys, and eggs, which was converted to cents/Canadian 
pound  chilled  carcass  weight  by  multiplying  by  the  respective  dressing  percentages  and 
exchange rate. 
U.S. Dressing percentages are calculated from data obtained from the USDA, ERS Red Meat 
Yearbook (94006)
17 excel spreadsheet titled- averagedressedweight.xls, table 2, 3 and 4 and 
averageliveweight.xls, table 15 using the formular: 
 
18Dressing Percentage for steer, heifer or cow = Carcass Weight of steer, heifer or cow/ 
    Live Weight of cattle X 100 
 
However, constant values that have been in use by the USDA and Agricultural Marketing 
Service of the USDA are 63% for steers and heifers and 47% for cows. 
Carcass weights data from 1980-1996 are obtained from the Canada livestock and Meat 
trade  report  on  page  8  titled:  Average  warm  carcass  weights  for  federally  and  provincial 
inspected packing plants (Lbs); 1997-2001 from Janet Hovis of CANFAX, and 2002-2005 is 








                                                 
16 for an explanation on this see: http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/foodpricespreads/meatpricespreads/  
17 See details from: http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?documentID=1354   
18 See http://ars.sdstate.edu/MeatSci/May99-1.htm; http://www.safarix.com/013046256X/ch23lev1sec5    71 
 
Appendix II.3.: The Model 
 
Following Gardner (1975), Holloway (1991) and Wohlgenant’s (1989) empirical assumptions, 
we will assume, initially, that farm commodity supplies of cattle are exogenous since most of 
these  supplies  in  the  cattle  market  section  are  predetermined  over  a  long  period  of  time, 
sometimes  through  contracting,  hedging  and  captive  supply  agreements.  Secondly,  the  N 
variables  in  (1)-  population,  pork  CPI  that  affect  cattle/beef  demand-  are  considered 
exogenous.  Thirdly,  the  supply  of  non-farm  inputs
19  is  perfectly  elastic,  making  Pb  in  (7) 
exogenous. 
 
With the empirical assumptions in place and assuming the estimation of elasticities at all levels 
of the market, the elasticities of a price spread between any two market levels can be expressed 
as: 
  z pa z px z r E E E , , , - º                 (12) 
where  r E  is the spread elasticity between two market levels, r is the spread between market 
levels and Z Î{ } b P a N , , , N is the demand shifter, Px and Pa are the prices at wholesale/retail 
for beef and farm for cattle respectively. 
The first term on the right hand side of (12) is the supply elasticity at the wholesale or retail 
level with respect to Z while the second term is the elasticity at the farm level
20.  
 
Three alternative equations are estimated for each region and cattle type.  
The three estimated equations, where equation (13) is either farm-wholesale or wholesale-retail 
farm spread, equation (14) is the inverse supply equation for the retail or wholesale levels and 
equation (15) is the inverse supply equation at the farm gate or for cattle producers are as 
follows: 
 
k t R t t R t t R
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19 This is represented by the processing and retail costs indices at the packer and retail levels 
20 These different elasticities are not shown in this paper but see Holloway (1991) for the empirical derivation.   72 
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where , ,q j b ,  { } a x R j , , =Î   and  { } 11 ,..., 1 , , , , , , , t t PD bp R pa b a x qÎ   are  coefficients  to  be 
estimated for every cattle class and region; and k t j , , e ,  { } a x R j , , Î , are disturbance terms which 
are assumed to be normally distributed. N, a, Pa and Pb are as stated earlier, and RL, BP, and 
DUM represents independent variables for lagged dependent variables (dynamic adjustments), 
by-product  prices,  and  seasonal  dummies  respectively.  These  equations  (13)  to  (15)  are 
estimated for steers, heifers and cows for Canada eastern and western regions, and the U.S. 
Data are expressed in the first set of estimations reported here in level form. Ordinary least 
squares estimation method is used to estimate each equation since there are no cross equation 
restrictions,  and  the  fact  that  each  equation  has  the  same  type  of  independent  variables 
appearing on the right hand side. 
 
From  the  elasticity  equations,  necessary  and  (almost)  sufficient  conditions  for  perfect 
competition  (where  H0  :  θ=0)  in  the  cattle/  beef  markets  are  developed
21  to  be 
(i) , , , a pa N pa E E - =  (ii)  , , , a px N px E E - =  and (iii)  . , , a r N R E E - =  
The sufficient condition is satisfied for perfect competition by imposing  0 = xb b , where  xb b  is 
the coefficient on the price of the processing/retail costs index. 
 
To test for market power pre and post BSE, each estimated equation is done for pre (1980-May 
2003) and post BSE (May 2003-December 2005). Tests for the presence of structural change in 
the Canadian cattle/beef industry in May of 2003 are also carried out using standard Chow 
tests. 
 
                                                 
21 Also see Holloway (1991) for proof of these propositions.   73 
Appendix 3. 
Table A3.1: Estimates of the Spread equations, Farm Price, Wholesale and Retail Prices 
Equations under the Null Hypothesis of Perfect Competition  and Cost Economies in 
Marketing. (1980:1 to 2003:5; and 2003:6 to 2005:12)  
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0.02  1.09  2.54   74 
Hypothesis based on F-statistics at 1%, 5% and 10 %  ( * ,**, and *** respectively.) 
Note: 
F-W S= farm to wholesale price spread for steer          FP S= farm price for steer                                    
WP C=wholesale price for cow 
F-W H= farm to wholesale price spread for heifer       RP S= change in retail price for steer 
cow           RP C=  retail price for cow 
F-W C= farm to wholesale price spread for cow            WP S= wholesale price for steers                       
FP C= farm price for cow 
W-R S= wholesale to retail price spread for steer           WP S= wholesale price for steer 
W-R H= wholesale to retail price spread for heifer         FP H= farm price for heifer 
W-R C= wholesale to retail price spread for cow            WP H= wholesale price for heifer 
WP H= wholesale price for heifer                                    RP H= retail price for heifer   75 
 
Table A3.2. Regional Unrestricted Parameter Estimates for the Farm ,Wholesale, Retail and Price Spread equations Pre and Post BSE 
  (1980:1-2003:5; and 2003:6 -2005:12) 









Retail Price equation 
Variables  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST 
Constant  -51.07*  1890.58  21.32  606.10  -20.22*  -2498.21  -54.76*  -41.91  -10.86  1254.13 
Populatn.  2.42*  -64.28***  -1.03  -21.99  1.35*  86.26***  3.05*  3.18  0.35  -41.25 
LDV  0.77*  0.44**  0.85*  0.22  0.87*  0.52**  0.86*  0.36  0.97*  0.12 
CPI Pork  -0.03  1.37**  0.20*  1.16***  -0.06**  -0.55  -0.08**  0.96  0.03  2.55* 
BPW  -0.22**  -1.03  0.01  -0.15  0.04  1.52***  -0.11  0.26  -0.02  -0.09 
Cost Ind.  0.15  0.84  -0.02  0.49  0.01  -1.39  0.12  -0.17  0.08**  0.75 
Qty  -0.1E-07  -0.15E-07  -0.1E-08  0.25E-08  -0.4E-07  0.16E-07  -0.5E-07*  -0.57E-09  -0.2E-07  0.11E-08 
T2  -0.18  -0.94  2.56  -10.70  -0.95  4.77  -1.27  2.17  1.57  -10.90*** 
T3  1.02  0.22  0.62  -15.76  0.12  11.80  0.90  8.39  1.41  -12.37 
T4  4.12**  6.95  2.05  -15.00  -1.08  5.79  2.61  10.44  4.16*  -7.41 
T5  4.00**  9.98  0.50  -8.23  -1.80**  1.78  1.42**  10.23  1.13  0.31 
T6  -0.18  10.53  6.38*  -12.59  -3.19*  1.03  -4.42*  9.82  1.47  -4.49 
T7  -0.84  5.46  8.82*  -10.13  -1.71**  -1.31  -3.49**  1.44  5.15*  -9.32 
T8  -1.72  -3.20  4.08***  -7.02  -0.47  4.34  -2.98  -3.78  0.43  -14.27*** 
T9  -1.61  -9.53  4.29***  -12.95  -1.70**  15.04  -3.89**  1.05  -0.02  -15.50** 
T10  -2.34  -3.62  -0.56  -16.90  0.45  10.55  -2.34  3.43  -3.11**  -18.67** 
T11  -3.07***  4.65  2.71  -9.18  0.33  5.48  -2.99  8.78  -0.07  -2.12 
T12  -1.80  5.07  5.57**  -6.51  -1.64**  -0.02  -3.53***  5.67  2.19  -0.30 
R
2  0.96  0.86  0.83  0.71  0.92  0.82  0.96  0.73  0.98  0.94 
D-h  -4.47  -1.32  -0.71  0.87  6.04  1.19  -1.82  0.85  0.73  2.79 
Chow Test  0.041    0.07    0.05    0.12    0.58   
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Table A3.3.: Regional Unrestricted Parameter Estimates for the Farm ,Wholesale, Retail and Price Spread equations Pre and Post BSE 
  (1980:1-2003:5; and 2003:6 -2005:12 









Retail Price equation 
Variables  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST 
Constant  -69.63*  1662.06  10.50  705.74  1.35  -2158.59  -30.57**  -142.81  11.46  1244.44 
Populatn.  3.22*  -56.86  -0.52  -25.44  1.17***  75.18  1.97**  6.66  -0.69  -40.90 
LDV  0.65*  0.43  0.84*  0.23  0.58*  0.47**  0.86*  0.37  0.98*  0.12 
CPI Pork  -0.04  1.38**  0.18**  1.18  0.00  -0.54  -0.05  0.93  0.06  2.55 
BPW  -0.34**  -1.04**  -0.6E-03  -0.24*  -0.02  1.53***  -0.11  0.36  -0.01***  -0.07 
Cost Ind.  0.27*  0.78  -0.02  0.56  0.03  -1.26  0.11**  -0.25  0.06  0.73 
Qty  -0.6E-08  0.2E-07  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.61E-08  0.00  0.00  0.00 
T2  1.10  -1.68  -0.4E-07  -10.99  -1.19  5.34  -0.94  2.48  1.73  -10.84* 
T3  1.66  0.88  0.61  -16.34  0.50  10.49  0.98  9.08  1.43  -12.27 
T4  4.94**  6.35  1.72  -15.42  -0.77  6.12  2.03  11.00  4.07*  -7.28 
T5  4.96**  8.69  -0.03  -8.49  -1.46  2.96  0.73  10.69  1.12  0.46 
T6  3.99***  10.62  5.97**  -13.26  -6.69*  1.08  -5.54*  10.73  1.14  -4.23 
T7  -2.08  4.27  8.42*  -10.76  -0.74  -0.46  -4.24**  2.25  5.04*  -9.07 
T8  -0.48  -5.66  3.89***  -7.84  -2.30  5.92  -3.71***  -2.73  0.17  -13.98 
T9  -1.66  -9.90  4.19**  -13.61  -2.07  14.58  -4.26**  1.90  -0.14  -15.25* 
T10  -2.05  -4.76  -0.44  -17.53  -0.39  11.44  -2.52  4.35  -3.30**  -18.43* 
T11  -1.93  2.92  2.69  -9.55  -0.62  7.36  -2.81  9.34  0.04  -1.94* 
T12  -1.42  3.47  5.33  -5.89  -1.45  1.34  -3.34***  5.10  2.47  -0.36 
R
2  0.92  0.87  0.83  0.71  0.68  0.83  0.96  0.72  0.98  0.94 
D-h  -4.24  -3.8-1.155  -0.57  0.69  -3.85  0.92  -1.49  0.65  0.72  2.55 
Chow Test  0.01    0.18    0.388    0.01    0.20   
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Table A3.4.: Regional Unrestricted Parameter Estimates for the Farm ,Wholesale, Retail and Price Spread equations Pre and Post BSE 
  (1980:1-2003:5; and 2003:6 -2005:12 









Retail Price equation 
Variables  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST 
Constant  -77.89***  576.56  27.89**  412.74  11.53*  99.47  -41.70*  602.86  -0.43  1494.58 
Populatn.  3.57  -16.74  -1.38**  -16.57  0.10*  -1.89  2.48*  -16.56  -0.18  -48.74 
LDV  0.75*  0.36  0.85*  0.25  0.83*  0.42*  0.86*  0.38  0.98*  0.20 
CPI Pork  -0.08  1.41  0.19*  1.00  0.02  -0.52  -0.06  0.87  0.03  2.16* 
BPW  -0.38  1.19867***  -0.01  -0.57  0.10  0.19  -0.13  1.15  -0.01  0.37 
Cost Ind.  0.28  -0.73  -0.02  0.63  -0.05**  0.29  0.12**  -0.34  0.07**  0.61 
Qty  0.00  8.76E-08  0.00  0.29E-07  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
T2  1.39**  1.579  2.80  -10.65  -2.62  1.89  -1.14  3.28  1.84  -9.34 
T3  1.66  7.341  0.54  -16.54  -1.03  4.35  0.68  10.95  1.24  -9.45 
T4  5.23*  13.94  2.15  -16.45  -3.26  0.01  1.78  13.48  3.90*  -5.20 
T5  3.71**  17.49  0.32  -11.55  -3.13  -2.58  0.15  14.19  0.38  1.25 
T6  -1.92*  14.37  6.60*  -14.97  -3.41*  1.86  -5.94*  15.41  1.10  -0.96 
T7  -2.12**  8.11  7.93*  -13.17  -2.69**  1.03  -4.88**  7.78  3.72*  -6.18 
T8  -0.87*  6.09  4.44**  -11.44  -3.70**  -0.26  -4.33**  3.93  0.37  -10.57 
T9  0.37*  9.36  5.03**  -15.80  -5.63**  1.61  -4.85**  9.10  0.44  -10.03 
T10  4.18**  13.7  1.14  -20.62  -7.28  0.95  -2.77  12.74  -1.52  -12.20 
T11  4.02*  21.5  3.12  -11.16  -6.88  -1.79  -2.91  17.75  0.32  4.78 
T12  0.10***  11.69  5.56**  -7.59  -3.37**  2.64  -3.54***  12.72  2.12  5.02 
R
2  0.78  0.74  0.81  0.67  0.96  0.79  0.96  0.73  0.98  0.94 
D-h  -3.70  -2.37  -0.81  0.29  -1.62  -1.61  -1.62  2.19  1.09  1.57 
Chow Test  0.07    0.11    0.10    0.10    0.73   
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Table A3.5:. Regional Unrestricted Parameter Estimates for the Farm ,Wholesale, Retail and Price Spread equations Pre and Post BSE 
  (1980:1-2003:5; and 2003:6 -2005:12 









Retail Price equation 
Variables  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST 
Constant  -54.38*  1124.35  -1.277**  693.24  -9.729**  -1505.72  -45.69*  -138.25  -3.45  693.24 
Populatn.  2.71*  -37.06  0.845**  -24.99  0.840*  51.15  2.71*  6.44  0.01  -24.99 
LDV  0.77*  0.57  0.190*  0.23  0.886*  0.42  0.86*  0.37  0.97*  0.23 
CPI Pork  -0.03*  0.89*  0.200*  1.17***  -0.061**  -0.25  -0.08  0.94  0.03  1.17*** 
BPW  -0.37  0.24  -0.013  -0.23  0.188*  0.16  -0.05  0.34  0.05  -0.23 
Cost Ind.  0.12*  0.14  0.000  0.55  0.022  -0.41  0.10**  -0.23  0.07**  0.55 
Qty 
0.00*  -0.2E-07  0.7E-07  0.00  0.000**  0.00 
-1.16E-
07**  0.00  -0.1E-07  0.00 
T2  0.46  8.34  2.675  -10.93  -1.484**  -3.73  -1.13  2.39  1.72  -10.93 
T3  2.18  10.76  0.572  -16.24  -0.942  -0.25  0.93  8.89  1.44  -16.24 
T4  3.08  12.57  1.613  -15.33  -0.043  -1.34  2.41  10.80  3.92*  -15.33 
T5  2.47  14.27***  0.308  -8.42  -0.905  -3.91  0.72  10.46  0.78  -8.42 
T6  -2.13**  14.75***  6.053**  -13.11  -2.253*  -4.09  -5.29*  10.33  0.98  -13.11 
T7  -1.14  13.68  8.708*  -10.60  -2.334*  -12.85  -4.09**  1.87  4.85*  -10.60 
T8  -1.23  4.50  3.996***  -7.64  -1.812**  -8.55  -3.54***  -3.19  0.11  -7.64 
T9  -0.90  4.52  4.180**  -13.45  -2.723*  -2.80  -4.06**  1.47  -0.15  -13.45 
T10  0.307  11.60  -0.688**  -17.37  -2.156*  -5.79  -2.26  3.91  -3.14  -17.37 
T11  -2.81***  12.89***  2.561  -9.44  0.678  -3.89  -2.64  8.99  0.05*  -9.44 
T12  -3.17**  11.94  5.619**  -5.93  -0.177  -7.26  -3.63***  5.05  2.21*  -5.93 
R
2  0.96  0.89  0.84    0.92  0.78  0.96  0.73  0.98  0.71 
D-h  -4.53  -0.11  -0.7  0.72  5.28  2.13  -1.68  0.20  0.86  0.72 
Chow Test  1.22    510    4.41    0.01    0.22   
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Table A3.6: Regional Unrestricted Parameter Estimates for the Farm ,Wholesale, Retail and Price Spread equations Pre and Post BSE 
  (1980:1-2003:5; and 2003:6 -2005:12) 
                           Regression coefficients for heifers in  Eastern Canada   
Farm-Wholesale 
equation 






Retail Price equation 
Variables  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST 
Constant  -109.82*  977.50  21.70  668.1  -2.42  67.82  -47.70*  -91.27  1.27  1259.22 
Populatn.  5.40*  -32.48  -1.11  -24.1  1.35**  -0.06  2.85*  4.88  -0.25  -41.37 
LDV  0.56*  0.56  0.85*  0.2*  0.54*  -0.37  0.86*  0.37  0.98*  0.12 
CPI Pork  -0.08  0.93*  0.18**  1.2***  -0.04  0.23  -0.09  0.95  0.04  2.55 
BPW  -0.63*  0.20***  0.18  -0.2  0.33**  -0.42  -0.03  0.32  0.05  -0.07 
Cost Ind.  0.22*  0.12  -0.01  0.5  0.10**  0.49  0.10**  -0.21  0.08**  0.74 
Qty  0.00  -0.5E-07  0.73E-07  -0.52E-0.0  0.00**  0.00  -0.2E6***  0.00  0.49E-07  0.00 
T2  0.90  6.94  2.62  -10.8  -1.16  -7.66  -1.08  2.31  1.77  -10.86 
T3  2.88  11.06  0.62  -16.0  -0.75  -10.05  0.85  8.71  1.46  -12.30 
T4  4.95**  13.91  1.89  -15.1**  -0.07  -8.15  2.16  10.68  3.80  -7.31 
T5  4.60**  13.41***  0.48  -8.3***  -0.94  -6.07  0.43  10.40  0.81  0.42 
T6  3.47  13.91***  6.31*  -12.8***  -5.41*  -6.34  -5.62*  10.20  0.95*  -4.29 
T7  -1.66  12.80***  8.91*  -10.3  -0.74  -14.74  -4.43**  1.76  4.87*  -9.12 
T8  -0.39  4.69  4.19***  -7.2  -2.33  -17.47  -3.91**  -3.35  0.12**  -14.02 
T9  0.07  3.57  4.39***  -13.1  -3.92**  -11.20  -4.46**  1.40  -0.15**  -15.26 
T10  1.01  10.72  -0.49  -17.0  -3.56**  -14.86  -2.61  3.82  -3.17  -18.42 
T11  -1.29  11.04  2.77  -9.2  -1.80  -5.88  -3.06  9.01  0.06  -1.90 
T12  -2.96  9.52  5.65**  -6.0  -1.02  -3.67  -3.90**  5.38  2.34***  -0.21 
R
2  0.93  0.89  0.84  0.89  0.57  0.79  0.96  0.72  0.98  0.79 
D-h  -3.19  0.28  -0.71  0.28  -4.62  1.80  -1.63  2.02  0.85  1..80 
Chow Test  1.24    0.43    0.12    0.06    0.18   
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Table A3.7: Regional Unrestricted Parameter Estimates for the Farm ,Wholesale, Retail and Price Spread equations Pre and Post BSE 
  (1980:1-2003:5; and 2003:6 -2005:12) 
                           Regression coefficients for cows in  Eastern Canada   
Farm-Wholesale 
equation 






Retail Price equation 
Variables  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST 
Constant  -83.54*  3490.94  20.27***  -1224.69  3.96***  -337.84  -53.81*  3244.23  -5.10  2827.04 
Populatn.  4.37*  -108.28  -1.02***  34.99  -0.02  11.44  3.46*  -99.90  0.15  -90.82 
LDV  0.67*  0.41***  0.84*  0.27  0.95*  0.42*  0.79*  0.37  0.97*  0.18 
CPI Pork  -0.05  0.97***  0.17**  1.06  0.01  -0.25  -0.06  0.78  0.03  2.15* 
BPW  -0.35**  3.57  0.16  -2.10  0.04  0.05  -0.05  3.48  0.08  1.51 
Cost Ind.  0.20*  -0.59  -0.03  0.69  0.00  0.11  0.10**  -0.37  0.06***  0.62 
Qty  -0.12E-05*  0.9E-06  -0.1E-06  -0.5E-06  0.12E-02  0.61E-08  -0.1E-5*  0.96E-06  -0.3-06***  0.48E-06 
T2  -1.00  1.98  2.65  -12.16  -0.38  3.91  -0.97  5.31  1.78  -8.41 
T3  2.27  11.64  0.34  -19.52  -1.75*  4.64  1.23  15.16  1.24  -7.65 
T4  5.12*  15.24  1.95  -20.56  -2.36*  5.02  2.95  19.65  4.01*  -2.36 
T5  2.11  22.28  -0.11  -17.61  -0.84***  1.64  1.11  23.57  0.30  5.68 
T6  -3.80**  23.27  6.23*  -22.81  -1.24**  4.57  -4.94*  27.42  1.02  4.77 
T7  -3.43**  18.53  7.54*  -23.17  -2.05*  4.97  -4.45**  23.03  3.51*  1.29 
T8  -2.25  19.07  4.09***  -23.13  -3.35*  3.64  -4.21**  21.51  0.18  -2.08 
T9  -1.92  26.95  4.71**  -29.05  -4.03*  3.52  -4.76**  29.11  0.27  -0.31 
T10  1.05  38.87  1.01  -35.94  -4.67*  -1.13  -2.78  36.16  -1.59  -0.98 
T11  0.84  45.82  3.03  -27.25  -3.79*  -2.20  -2.88  42.68  0.28  16.93 
T12  -1.71  41.45  5.36**  -24.03  -1.52*  -2.24  -3.66**  38.67  1.99  17.86 
R
2  0.96  0.83  0.81  0.68  0.93  0.89  0.97  0.74  0.98  0.94 
D-h  -1.51  -1.4  -0.71  2.00  1.64  -0.62  -1.19  0.18  1.03  1.35 
Chow Test  0.15    0.32    0.54    0.05    0.36   
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Table A3.8: Regional Unrestricted Parameter Estimates for the Farm ,Wholesale, Retail and Price Spread equations Pre and Post BSE 
  (1980:1-2003:5; and 2003:6 -2005:12) 
                           Regression coefficients for steers in  the US   
Farm-Wholesale 
equation 
Wholesale – Retail 
equation 
Farm Price equation  Wholesale Price 
equation 
Retail Price equation 
Variables  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST 
Constant 
-11.42*  -573.25  -41.40*  1906.64  -9.43**  -2023.55***  -18.32* 
-
2446.89
**  0.05  -0.24 
Populatn. 
35.47***  2385.74  155.41**  -7354.97  230.08*  7204.54***  221.15* 
9091.68*
*  -24.56*  385.27 
LDV  0.82*  0.26  0.84*  0.52*  0.82*  0.51  0.04  -1.78*  175.90*  -1556.36 
CPI Pork  -0.01  -0.31  0.03  0.93  -0.11*  0.63  0.87*  0.87*  0.95*  0.14 
BPW  -0.24*  -0.14  -0.02  4.62**  0.27**  1.90  -0.12*  0.09  -0.07**  1.81* 
Cost Ind.  0.06*  -0.63**  0.09**  1.22***  0.3E-02  -1.40**  0.08*  -2.33  0.25  8.74 
Qty  0.00**  0.13E-04  0.2E-05  -0.15E-04  -0.8E-4*  0.38E-04  -0.1E-4**  0.3E-04  -0.9E-05**  0.18E-04 
T2  -0.53  -3.35  1.69  9.21  -1.36  11.81  -1.59  8.93  0.28  8.90 
T3  0.37  3.44  0.70  -13.85  0.41  19.32***  0.95  28.97**  1.89  4.62 
T4  1.81*  14.98*  1.65  -10.10  -0.56  19.01**  1.35  32.91*  3.22*  20.47* 
T5  3.65***  9.51  -0.85  1.47  0.03  12.71  3.54*  14.28  2.97**  22.56* 
T6  1.61*  1.88  3.33**  4.19  -1.20  -2.86  0.13  -5.21  3.75*  0.79 
T7  -0.09  -1.86  5.05*  3.94  -1.03  -6.30  -1.28  -4.87  3.88*  -6.25 
T8  1.44**  2.18  1.00  -5.73  1.77  3.26  3.12  13.67  4.06*  -3.15 
T9  0.92  0.87  2.58***  -13.87  -0.70  4.37  0.25  10.91  2.70**  -10.01 
T10  0.60  3.18  0.38  -17.61  1.19  11.63  1.82  17.91***  2.04**  -9.99 
T11  1.39**  -5.06  1.07  3.24  0.24  6.49  1.89  3.39  2.80*  -2.58 
T12  1.55  -3.03  1.16  -0.50  -1.67  -1.49  -0.04  2.44  0.91  -5.10 
R
2  0.92  0.89  0.97  0.88  0.91  0.82  0.94  0.92  0.99  0.95 
D-h  -0.5  -2.47  2.31  -1.4  6.38  0.81  5.14  1.11  1.95  -1.22 
Chow Test  5.35    17.87    0.28    0.13    25.33     82 
 
Table A3.9: Regional Unrestricted Parameter Estimates for the Farm ,Wholesale, Retail and Price Spread equations Pre and Post BSE 
  (1980:1-2003:5; and 2003:6 -2005:12) 
                           Regression coefficients for heifers in the US   
Farm-Wholesale 
equation 








Variables  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST 
Constant  -19.61*  -484.96  -38.84*  1817.68  -12.02**  -2077.34**  -19.60*  -2440.11**  0.05  -0.11 
Populatn.  168.13*  2207.36  155.68**  -6791.9  139.0*  7278.00**  168.12*  8966.16**  -24.66*  302.93 
LDV  0.03  0.32  0.84*  0.56*  0.86*  0.70**  0.03  -1.41**  144.54*  -1290.21 
CPI Pork  0.89*  -0.48***  0.03  0.81  -0.07**  0.17  0.88*  0.95*  0.94*  0.12 
BPW  -0.08**  -0.88  0.03  3.62***  0.318***  1.65  -0.08**  -0.22  -0.05  1.63* 
Cost Ind.  0.11  -0.53***  0.08**  0.94  -3.88E-3  -1.02**  0.10  -2.44  0.28***  9.04* 
Qty  -0.77E-8  0.00  0.14E-08  -5.71E-08  6.48E-09  0.9E-07  -7.72E-9  0.73E-07  -0.77E-8  0.03E-07 
T2  -0.93  -4.28  1.23  10.33  -7.17E-3  8.82  -0.92  5.24  0.36  6.39 
T3  1.00  5.38  0.51  -8.2  0.711  12.97  1.00  22.98**  1.59  2.48 
T4  0.56  13.69*  1.19  -10.27  -0.94  17.69**  0.563  29.96*  1.75  18.84* 
T5  1.42  9.74***  -1.19  1.212  -2.0***1  11.60  1.42  11.76  0.31  20.22* 
T6  -1.80  5.57  2.64**  5.12  -3.*2  -0.66  -1.79  -3.52  1.05  0.17 
T7  -2.75**  1.96  4.08*  4.52  -2.6**2  -2.76  -2.74**  -2.45  1.45  -6.72 
T8  1.65  6.15  0.75  -3.58  -0.02  6.17  1.6513  14.95  2.42  -3.98 
T9  -0.13  4.42  2.09  -9.39  -0.96  3.75  -0.134  9.96  1.95**  -10.71 
T10  1.67  6.29  0.29  -10.8  0.90  7.67  1.66  14.18  1.92***  -11.64 
T11  1.86  -3.46  0.56  5.32  0.99  4.67  1.86  1.84  2.28**  -3.96 
T12  -0.37  -0.10  0.63  1.57  -1.39  -2.28  -0.37  2.18  0.04  -5.40 
R
2  0.95  0.89  0.97  0.89  0.93  0.82  0.95  0.91  0.992.9  0.95 
D-h  5.24  -1.9  2.43  -1.68  6.63  0.88  5.24  1.39  24.75  -.068 
Chow Test  0.028    17.67    0.7    0.28       
 




Table A3.10: Regional Unrestricted Parameter Estimates for the Farm ,Wholesale, Retail and Price Spread equations Pre and Post BSE 
  (1980:1-2003:5; and 2003:6 -2005:12) 
                           Regression coefficients for cows in the US   
Farm-Wholesale 
equation 








Variables  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST  PRE  POST 
Constant  -5.570**  -344.48  -30.00*  1200.63  -6.54  -1424.28  -11.02  -1778.43**  -15.89**  180.18 
Populatn.  27.290**  1511.26  119.55**  -4600.22  81.15**  5275.04***  95.62*  -1.06763**  83.72**  -377.68 
LDV  0.863*  0.23  0.84*  0.52*  0.90*  0.60***  0.92*  6791.97**  0.95*  0.071 
CPI Pork  -0.011  -0.40***  0.02  0.88**  -0.08*  -0.06  -0.08*  0.845*  -0.06**  1.32 
BPW  -0.166**  -0.43  0.00  5.03*  0.49*  0.38  0.34***  -0.37  0.51*  8.98* 
Cost Ind.  0.038*  -0.31  0.07**  0.55  -0.01  -0.77  0.059  -2.81  0.03  -0.425-* 
Qty  -0.5E-06  0.38E-03  -0.71E-5  -0.11E-03  0.24E-05  0.47E-04  0.30E-05  4.50E-05  0.6E-05  0.20E-03 
T2  -0.776  -1.85  0.88  6.07  -0.08  10.07  -0.85  8.00  -0.16  2.70 
T3  0.080  3.58  0.08  -10.69  -0.32  18.18**  -0.21  24.98*  -0.50  9.24** 
T4  1.077**  13.38*  0.36  -11.66  -1.99***  15.99***  -0.92  26.64*  -1.03  15.34** 
T5  2.588*  10.67***  -1.76  -5.45  -3.19*  14.06  -0.66  14.32  -2.85*  16.59** 
T6  0.964**  5.19  1.30  -4.08  -4.21*  5.49  -3.36*  1.39  -2.31*  1.11 
T7  -0.550  1.71  1.79  -4.79  -4.41*  1.78  -5.06*  -0.518  -3.61*  -9.40 
T8  0.624  3.50  -1.39  -8.98  -3.00*  8.32  -2.37**  12.35***  -4.13*  -4.97 
T9  -0.004  1.89  -0.23  -13.19**  -3.60*  7.61  -3.56*  9.75  -3.94*  -9.68*** 
T10  -0.100  2.66  -1.86***  -13.97***  -2.35**  10.92  -2.42**  13.17***  -4.26*  -8.24 
T11  0.317  -3.75  -0.72  0.72  -0.44  4.76  -0.04  0.780  -0.59  -7.02 
T12  0.689  -1.59  -0.08  -1.44  -1.42  1.92  -0.70  3.58  -0.69  -3.61 
R
2  0.92  0.89  0.97  0.90  0.91  0.80  0.94  0.90  0.90  0.96 
D-h  0.127  -1.5  1.83  -0.73  0.66  1.84  6.109  2.21  -0.72  2.88 
Chow Test  7.44    19.55    0.91    0.48    24.20     84 
   1 
 